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'Our morale is unshakeable' 
East Timor resistance leader interviewed 
After 15 years without any physical contact with outsiders, 
Shanana Gusmao, who has fought with the armed resistance 
since 1975 and who took over the leadership in 1979, after 
almost all the leaders had fallen, met and gave an interview 
to an Australian, Robert Domm. Domm undertook this very 
hazardous assignment on behalf of the Australian Broad-
casting Corporation. 
This historic meeting has brought to the outside world a 
new and inspiring insight into the present state of the armed 
resistance in East Timor, the inflexible will of Shanana, 
commander of the resistance army, Falintil, and the superb 
organising capability of the East Timorese resistance .in the 
bush and in the Indonesian-occupied towns and villages. 
Slaughter 
in Aceh 
After more than a year of widespread disturbances in Aceh, 
North Sumatra, where a movement demanding indepen-
dence has been met with a high level of military activity, 
involving the armed forces' special troops, Kopassus, there 
is disturbing evidence of massacres, atrocities and arrests on 
a huge scale. The situation is so bad that a vigorous 
campaign is clearly needed to press for international human 
rights organisations to be given access to the area in order 
to carry out an independent inquiry. 
There are many mass graves in Aceh, North Sumatra, and 
people there frequently discover decomposing, unidentified 
human corpses, according to a human rights lawyer who 
visited Aceh in early November. The lawyer (believed to be 
from the Legal Aid Institute, LBH) said the local people 
think the many deaths are the result of operations by troops 
to crush a rebeJJion in Aceh known officialJy as the GPK or 
security disruptors movement, the term by which the Ger-
akan Aceh Merdeka or GAM, as the Free Aceh Movement 
is known in Indonesia. 
Bodies have been found in plantations and along rivers in 
the north-east of Aceh, the centre of GAM activities. 
In one incident, villagers working on a river bank found 
Along with the documents brought out by Robert Domm 
was a letter from Shanana to the Australian Prime Minister, 
Bob Hawke, urging his government to change its position 
on East Timor and support the independence struggle. He 
called on Canberra to contribute towards finding a solution 
in East Timor in line with the principles it has adopted 
towards other regional conflicts such as Cambodia. 
We publish in this issue extracts from Robert Domm's 
interview (page 9) along with extracts from the ABC's Mark 
Aarons' moving account of how Domm reached the Falintil 
leader's mountain camp, after passing through Indonesian 
troop .positions undetected (page 15). These important 
documents are soon to be published in full in Australia. * 
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eight bodies tied together, weighted down and drowned. 
It has got to the point where villagers say they are fed up 
with having to bury bodies they fish out of the rivers. "It 
happens pretty well every day," the lawyer said. 
According to Reuter's Elizabeth Pisani in Jakarta, a 
western human rights observer in the Indonesian capital had 
reliable reports of the discovery of a mass grave in Alue 
Mira, Aceh in June this year. 
"Nearby villagers couldn't eat because of a foul smell. 
When they went to investigate, they found an open pit with 
200 bodies in it, some of them completely decomposed." 
While armed forces spokesperson Brig.Gen. Nurhadi 
Purwosaputro denied that Indonesian troops were respon-
sible, claiming that the army and the police had themselves 
taken many casualties, Reuter quoted political analysts as 
saying that the steady stream of murders is part of a classic 
pattern of Indonesian military behaviour. "It's the normal 
thing. After a military operation, there is an intelligence 
operation to terrify the locals." [Reuter, 8 November 1990] 
Corpses everywhere 
A Jakarta weekly had two weeks earlier filed a very 
disturbing report about the discovery of unidentified 
corpses, many with buUet wounds in the head. Bodies were 
found along the side of the Sumatra highway in Seumadam 
Village, Kejuruan Muda sub-district on 12, 15 and 16 
September under some rubber trees. The body found on 16 
September had been wrapped in a sack. Nearly two weeks 
later, villagers in Perapen, Pangkalasusu sub-district found 
a half-decomposed body. 
Tempo, 20 October 1990 
On 6 October, two bodies were found in a state-owned 
plantation in Tanggurono village, East Binjai sub-district. 
Many of the corpses were found with their big toes tied 
together and hands tied behind the back with a plastic cord. 
Villagers who reported these gruesome discoveries to the 
local police were told that no-one had been reported 
missing by relatives, so the bodies could not be identified. 
The villagers then proceeded to bury the victims without 
further examination. [Tempo, 20 October 1990] 
Grim dossier 
A dossier containing many original documents from ~ceh 
has been circulated to a number of human nghts 
organisations, including TAPOL, by th~ In~ormation 
Department of the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front 
based in Norsberg, Sweden. 
One report dated 5 October 1990 said that in September 
there was a massacre on the 27th km of Jalan (road) 
Takengon where nine unidentified bodies ~ere discovered. 
At Alue Guba Tjot Girek in Pase Provmce, seventeen 
bodies were found by villagers, while 27 more, already in 
an advanced state of decay were found in the Krueng (river) 
Teumieng. The victims had not been shot but drowned with 
heavy stones tied to their bodies. Another massacre had 
taken place in Seuneudon, near Kuala Simpang in Pase 
district where eight bodies with inflated bellies had been 
found. The report also identified a number of so-called 'red 
camps' [so named perhaps because they were set up by the 
red-beret commandos or Kopassus] where victims are held 
in custody and tortured. 
Another report dated 20 October and sent from Malaysia 
by someone who had just arrived from Aceh gave an 
account of the massacre of 56 prisoners on 12 September. 
The men were all being held in Rantjong Prison, Blang 
Tuphat, Lhokseumawe. All were stripped naked then shot 
at Buket Panglima, 28km Bireuen-Takengon. Three days 
later, villagers found the bodies in a ravine, most of them 
unidentifiable. 
The same report said many people being held in the jail 
were stripped naked and held in barbed-wire cells with 
their hands tied behind their backs. One form of torture was 
to unleash dogs on the prisoners which resulted in some 
being bitten to death. 
Another atrocity reportedly occurred south of Paya 
Bakong, at the Buloh Blang Ara plantation in July. Thirty-
five villagers were shot dead in the village of Buloh Blang 
Ara, after their homes had been burnt down; their bodies 
were hung on fences. 
Forms of torture 
Some of the reports in the dossier give lists of names of 
people who have been arrested and document their places 
of arrest. Also, details of the commonest forms of torture 
are given. [Most of these tortures are identical with those 
employed in East Timor and West Papua.] They include: 
- squeezing testicles with pliers; 
- holding down the victim's feet under heavy chairs on 
which soldiers sit, till the victim's toes are broken; 
- nailing down the victim's hand as if for crucifixion; 
- immersing the victim in boiling water; 
- placing the victim in a pool of filthy water for hours or 
days at a stretch; 
- stringing the victim upside down; 
- using cigarettes or hot irons to inflict bums. 
Loyalty pledges for released prisoners 
The dossier received by TAPOL includes a number of 
carbon copies of release documents bearing the original 
signatures of the prisoners in question. The documents are 
not photocopies as the signatures are written in a variety of 
inks and the official army rubber stamp is mauve in colour. 
The release documents are issued by Kodim OJ 02 Satuan 
Tugas Siwa Putih (Siwa Putih Task Force District Military 
Command 0102) and consist of a pledge to be loyal to the 
state and government of Indonesia, to refrain from promot-
ing "the ideas or teachings promoted by Hasan di Tiro" 
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[head of the Free Aceh Movement] and to refrain from 
"participating actively or passively in activities of whatever 
form that can create disturbances to security and order, and 
political stability." 
The set of documents relate to the release of eight persons 
o~ 25 April this year in Kota Bakti and are signed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Salim Sungkar, Commander of Kodim 
ACEH 
0102, in his capacity as commander of the unit's Siwa Putih 
Task Force. 
Editor's note: For background information to the disturb-
ances in Aceh, we refer you to TAPOL Bulletins 94 & 96] * 
West Papuans seek asylum in 
French Embassy, PNG 
Once again West Papuans have found themselves casualties of the world's reluctance to off end 
Indonesia. In October, 21 West Papuans were refused asylum by the French embassy in Port 
Moresby, Papua New Guinea. The asylum bid was prompted by the insecure situation for refUgees 
in the border camps and for West Papuans living in PNG, underlined by July's extradition of OPM 
leader Mecky Salosa and PNG's threat to treat others the same way. 
On October 15, a group of twenty-one West Papuans 
entered the French embassy in Port Moresby, Papua New 
Guinea, to seek political asylum. They handed in a letter 
explaining the political and humanitarian reasons why they 
no longer felt safe in PNG. The following day, PNG 
Foreign Minister Michael Somare said that their request was 
a matter for the French Government, but warned that they 
would be returned to their refugee camp if it was rejected. 
[Agence France Presse, October 16, 1990] 
On October 17 the refugees left at the request of the 
embassy. Spokesman Marcel Bruzzo said the embassy was 
sympathetic but could not do much to help. Somare again 
warned that the refugees would be sent back to their camp 
if a third country was not found. Hopes of this were 
fading as the Australian National Broadcasting Commission 
said the refugees were preparing to return to the East Awin 
camp in Western Province. [Pacnews, 17 October 1990.] 
Family in police custody 
By October 19, six of the asylum-seekers were in police 
custody in Balidi Prison, Port Moresby. [t is not known 
whether they are still there. The six are Jimmy Wawar, his 
wife and their four sons Isaac, Nelson, Ottis and Jackson. 
Wawar was practising as a lawyer in Jayapura until he fled 
from West Papua some years ago; the family has been 
living in Port Moresby for several years. According to the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Geneva, 
six of the asylum-seekers [the Wawar family] were living 
in the capital without permission and would be returned to 
the East Awin refugee camp. If they are to be charged with 
a crime, dearly they are in grave danger of being handed 
over, like Mecky Salosa, to the Indonesians. 
Other West Papuans who sought refuge in the French 
embassy include Michel Kareth, a camp leader in East 
Awin camp who ran the Arnold Ap school for refugee 
children untiJ it was dosed down; Agust Jambuani, 
Baldus, Donny Karury and Mesak Bame who were also 
living at the camp, John C.Jambuani and George Djit-
mau who live in West Papua; Thimothy Kambu, Titus 
Kareth, Elieser Harra, Sonny Aroy, Alfred Numbery, 
Elimas lck, Marthew Asikasay and Paul Hembring. 
TAPOL was informed by the UNHCR that one of the 
refuge-seekers would be allowed to remain in Port Mores-
by as he already had a residence permit to live in the PNG 
capital. Bar the six who were living in Port Moresby 
without permission [those in police custody], all the others 
were said to be refugees from the East Awin camp and 
would be flown back there. 
Indonesia welcomed the French refusal to assist the 







ON PAPUA LAND 
SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION 
OF ASIA'S AMAZON 
World Bandits Set Foot 
in Irian Jaya 
This packed issue of the 1ournal of Skephi (NGO Network 
for Forest Conservation in Indonesia), a hefty 96-page 
issue, can be obtained from TAPOL. £3.00 plus £1.00 
post & packing (UK or surface worldwide) or £3.00 (air). 
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Third country asylum has proven extremely difficult for 
West Papuan refugees, since most countries are unwilling 
to provoke Indonesian ire. For France, whose embassy in 
Beirut recently gave refuge to General Aoun, the right to 
security of twenty one West Papuans was outweighed by 
the need to avoid upsetting the Indonesian government. 
It is not as if West Papuan refugees in PNG do not have 
well-founded reason to feel vulnerable. On 22 July, a 
well-known OPM (Free Papua Movement) fighter, Mecky 
Salosa, was forcibly returned to Indonesia, in what amounts 
to an extradition. He was immediately taken into custody 
and is shortly to face trial [see TAPOL Bulletin No 101]. 
Jimmy Wawar was among several refugees who publicly 
expressed dismay on hearing this news. As PNG, under 
pressure from Indonesia, hardens its attitude towards the 
OPM and sympathisers, the security of more West Papuan 
refugees is under threat. * 
Replying on 30 September 1990 to a Jetter of protest 
about the deportation of Mecky SaJosa, PNG's Attor-
ney General and concurrently Minister of Justice, 
Bernard Narakobi wrote: 
Thank you for your letter relating to Mr Mecky 
Salosa. I too regret the actions of the authorities 
in PNG in handing over Salosa to Indonesian 
authorities. PNG is powerless against authorities 
in Indonesia. [Unabridged text of letter.] 
Before his appointment as Minister of Justice, Narak..., 
·obi was well-respected as a human rights lawyer 
with a record for defending the rights of West Papuan 
I . refugees. 
Harsh sentences in West Papua 
Five West Papuans, all of them former members of the Indonesian army, have been tried in Jayapura 
for subversion and found guilty of activities in support ofthe liberation movement, the OPM 
The fact that these trials have been reported at all in the 
national press is unusual. However the reports are strictly 
limited to the case against the defendants; nothing at all is 
feported about their defence pleas, whether they were 
allowed to call witnesses or how their defence laywers were 
appointed. 
Life sentence for Elieze Awom 
The heaviest sentence was given to Elieze Awom, 41, who 
was sentenced to life imprisonment by a military court on 
29 September. 
Awom who is from Biak, was arrested at Tarifa viUage on 
February 17, 1989. He was found guilty of desertion and 
joining the OPM in the West Papua-PNG border region. He 
was defended by police officers, Maj. D. Putu Sukardja and 
PoJice Lieut. (Letda) Widodo. There were eleven witnesses. 
Awom was allegedly involved in a series of ambushes on 
Indonesian troops from 1985 up to his arrest with 11 others. 
A member of the regional mobile brigade of the police 
since 1965, he deserted his unit in January 1984, taking a 
Colt 38 pistol with him, and crossed the border into PNG. 
(This was the time of an abortive uprising pJanned for early 
February 1984, following which hundreds of West Papuans 
from all walks of life in Jayapura, and thousands more from 
border villages, fled to Papua New Guinea.) 
The verdict said that, with 11 other members of the armed 
forces led by Marthen Prawar, the accused fought for the 
"the freedom of West Papua" and killed Indonesian troops 
(some reports say 8). Together with others, such as Leo Ap, 
he is said to have burned down a security post of SheJJ oil 
company at Sarmi and killed a Jayapura businessman whose 
wife .he abducted. Ti/a /rian says he held Unurumguay sub-
district officials hostage and burned down the sub-district 
office and sub-district military headquarters, killing a 
number of employees. The news agency Antara claims that 
Awom admitted all the charges, but had not yet decided 
whether to appeal At a prnvious session he toJd the court: 
"[ entered the forest and joined the OPM because [ was 
frustrated at my rights being ignored". He denied that his 
actions had disrupted public order. [Kompas 27/9/90] After 
the trial he was taken to the Waena military ·prison. 
Thirteen years for a song 
First Police Corporal Sokrates Yerisetouw, 33, father of 
four children, member of Oepapre police force (Jayapura), 
was sentenced to 13 years and dismissed from the police 
force for circulating copies of West Melanesian songs to 
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students at the Depapre Pembangunan High School. He was 
arrested in December 1989. The prosecution had asked for 
ten years. 
The other three men sentenced in September were: 
* First Police Sergeant Yance Konora who was given 3 
years for helping deliver a letter from Dr Thomas Wainggai 
about the "OPM 14 December anniversary" in 1989; 
* Sergeant Major Kaiwai, given 2 years. 
* First Sergeant Mangiagasi, sentenced to 3 years. 
(Sources: Post-Courier, October 1, 1990 Tifa Irian 4th 
week, September, 1990, Kompas 27 /9/90). 
WEST PAPUA 
AI Japan campaign for release of Wanggais 
The Okayama branch of Amnesty International is cam-
paigning for the release of Thomas Wainggai, sentenced to 
20 years in August 1989 for declaring an independent We~t 
Melanesian state in Jayapura on December 14, 1988. Hts 
wife, Teruko, got 8 years for sewing the flag. 
Amnesty Okayama is appealing to people to send 1,000 
postcards to President Suharto and Indonesia's ambassador 
to Japan, Yogi Supardi. Amnesty said: "They are innocent 
according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 
Teruko's mother, Shizuko Kohara, 76, said she is grateful 
that AI regards the Wainggais'imprisonment as a human 
rights violation and is praying for the couple's release. * 
Indonesian troops for PNG villages 
Papua New Guinea has sunk to new depths in its betrayal of the West Papuan independence movement 
by agreeing to the presence of Indonesian troops on PNG territory and by pledging closer cooperation 
with Indonesia to eliminate the Free Papua Organisation (OPM). 
Papua New Guinea's minister of defence, Benais Sabumei, 
has stated that Indonesian troops will be 'invited' into 
villages on the PNG side of the border with West Papua in 
the near future, to carry out "civic mission" work [kerja 
bakti]. The aim is to persuade the people of PNG, especial-
ly those living in the border area, 'no longer to regard 
Indonesian troops as their enemy.' 
Sabumei told the news to journalists immediately before 
returning to PNG from Yogyakarta in Java, where he had 
been attending the ninth session of the PNG-Indonesia 
Joint Border Committee from 29-31 October. 
According to Indonesian defence minister General Benny 
Murdani, Papua New Guinea has also agreed to step up 
military cooperation with Indonesia by conducting joint 
patrols along the 800km (500 mile) border. Until now, PNG 
has resisted Indonesian pressure to form joint patrols, but, 
in what could be interpreted as a veiled threat, Murdani said 
Port Moresby had now "realised that to allow the OPM to 
act as it has done in the past is harmful not only to Indo-
nesia but also to PNG." [Reuter November 4, 1990] 
Before returning home, Sabumei gave further details of 
the increased cooperation. He outlined a solution to the 'hot 
pursuit' issue: by Indonesia informing PNG about upcoming 
military operations against the OPM, increased coordination 
between PNG and Indonesian troops could prevent OPM 
guerillas seeking sanctuary in PNG and avoid the possibility 
of misunderstandings on the part of PNG troops. He denied 
past Indonesian accusations that PNG gave sanctuary to the 
OPM saying that, since PNG had no troops in the border 
region, the OPM could freely enter villages on the PNG 
side. [Kompas November 3, 1990] 
The agreements outlined by the two defence ministers 
formalise a situation which has existed for some time. 
Indonesia has de facto enjoyed the right of hot pursuit into 
Papua New Guinea, although there is no formal arrange-
ment, because PNG is unable or unwilling to resist. Offi-
cially, Indonesia claims incursions into PNG are 'accidental' 
but implicit in the plan to have Indonesian troops working 
in PNG villages, is the understanding that such incursions 
will become normal events. Why else would PNG want iU; 
·· ,Ma5s· repatriati()::ofrefugees ·· · .. · .· .. ·.·,.· .. , ...... " ........... c ..... , .•.•• 
·•. Six hundied arid 'mneiy refllgee8 ~~re' to be repatriated · •· · 
.·· .· overJrotn Nove~]?et . 22-24, froijr J38~tA\Vit) :refugee . 
cainp in .Papua Ne\v Qllfuea; batlftO the . West f apua~ ·.·. ·· 
... Tiley .will be. ~en fr9m &sf A~ to !Gunga, and 
then . ti<>wn l?Y pl~es . belongiQg •·. ~ th~ Mis~foliary 
· Aviati<>.n Fellowship . to . Mindiptapa in the !derauk~ 
districf A provincial military ··. official > quOted ·. ~ 
. . Jakarta Pdst, . NovemlJer; 13;-said the refugees . were 
·· · returning volnnt8rily and that regional ·c0nimander. · 
Major General Abino\Vo bad guaranteed their mdy. 
Aftertlieir .. return ···· t:hey ·Will · be ·"coumeUed ··· by lbcF 'c 
pfovmcial goiiernmerit." · . · .·· · · . ·.. . · •• < 
.. ·.·.··. Independent· Sources have ·ci>nfirm~ .· tbiit• some 350 · .. ·. · ... • 
.. ,refugees from ~tAwni camp are wanmgat Kinnga •· 
· · to be flo\'VJl back . to West fapua, .but indicate that .•••.• 
only about ·• 400 ·have expres8ed the ·desire to retmn < •.. · 
... vohiritaniy; •meaning that almost · 300 may be goulf ·. · 
' backagainSt their wil1. The PNG authorities have not · .. 
· .• given them · cause ·. for optfinism over a new .life in: · 
.... PNG or a tltird country~ •. Although &st Awhi is llow . 
. ·. a permanent settle~ent, riot merely a refugee canip, .· ... ·. 
· social and physical· conditions .. ar~ appa,Jlipg'.{lnd 1Jie (. 
·• .·.i~~~:~ .·;!~sh~v:n':~U:tied •~·no.'. t10C#len~> : still,•i••·· 
The refugees to be repatriated are 1bou8ht tQ be pa#.· ·. 
. of the 111ass exodus of Vill~gers frotii the Mindiptarla ·. 
aiea who .· fled · atrocities conimitted·•· .. by. IndonesiiUI 
troops during ClasheS with the OPMinJ984 . . · 
border villagers to get used to having the troops around if 
not to prepare them for further encounters? 
Of course, the troops are there for other reasons too. The 
'civic mission' of the Indonesian troops will doubtless be a 
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cover for intelligence networks and the conducting of 
counter-insurgency from within Papua New Guinea. Scope 
for gathering information about West Papuan refugees 
suspected of OPM involvement or sympathies will benefit 
Indonesia enormously and will, at the same time, heighten 
the threat to the security of those West Papuan refugees. 
Not only will West Papuans, Papua New Guinean sympath-
isers and all villagers living near the border suffer under the 
lengthening shadow of the Indonesian military, but Papua 
New Guinea's sovereignty will be further compromised. 
New screening test for border-crossers 
People Jiving along the common border between Papua 
New Guinea and Indonesia are to be issued with new 
border crossing cards. The new cards which are valid from 
September 29 and which replace the border passes, will 
only be issued to successfully screened applicants. They are 
part of a concerted attempt by the Indonesian and PNG 
governments to root out OPM independence fighters in 
border areas. 
According to PNG Foreign Minister Sir Michael Somare, 
"The issuing of the border crossing card is discretionary 
but eve.ry eligible person over 18 years of age will get one 
if he or she passes the screening tests." He said the screen-
ing process would include the views of elders of the village 
and [more significantly] checks by government officials 
from both countries. 
There is some confusion over the restrictions the cards 
will place on border-crossers, however. According to 
Somare, the card enables the holder to cross the border 
freely for traditional activities such as access to use of land 
for hunting and gardening or to visit relatives on either side 
of the border. But according to Indonesian Director General 
of Immigration, Roni Sikap Sinuraya, card-holders are 
limited to 30 days at a time in the neighbouring country 
and, since the cards are not passes, visits cannot be made 
without notice, as the cards must be signed and stamped by 
a government official in the visited country. [Kompas 
October 30, 1990) 
A ceremony to mark the introduction of the cards, 
witnessed by village elders and officials of both govern-
ments, was held simultaneously on 29 September in the 
border villages of Skouw, 60 km east of Jayapura in West 
Papua, and Wutung in West Sepik province, PNG. The 
Temawo barter market, which closed down due to clashes 
between OPM and Indonesian troops, has been reopened. 
[Post Courier, October 2, 1990, Suara Pembaruan, Septem-
ber 29, 1990] 
OPM attack on Skouw 
Some time earlier in September, the same border village 
was subject to an OPM attack. Regional military com-
mander Major-General Abinowo, in a rare public account 
of OPM activities, told Jaka.rta Post that OPM members 
had set fire to houses in Skouw, but that peace had now 
been restored. A local man said 25 houses were badly 
damaged in the attack, but that villagers had now come out 
of hiding. According to Abinowo the OPM only has 200 
members, scattered in the jungle - this figure is also used 
for the number of Fretilin guerillas in East Timor! - and 
that although they had received weapons from abroad, they 
were getting weaker. Diplomatic sources quoted by Reuter 
said the Indonesians had "rounded up a lot of leaders" and 
the Indonesians had "rounded up a lot of leaders" and had 
had "quite a lot of success" but also said that the o.PM 
enjoys widespread sympathy among the local population. 
[Reuter, October 18, 1990 Jaka.rta Post October ~8, 1?90) 
In contrast to the government practice of staymg silent 
about the security situation in West Papua, Major-General 
Abinowo has been unusuaJJy willing to talk about the OPM 
recently. While brushing off the OPM as a weakening force, 
he admits nevertheless that there are serious problems in the 
territory. In a lecture to the Indonesian Christian Student 
Movement (GMKI) in Jayapura, Abinowo said 'separatist' 
activities in Irian Jaya were fuelled by Melanesian racial 
sentiments and by people's frustration over living in 
backward conditions since colonial times. Living in small, 
isolated groups made these people suspicious about new 
and foreign things, made them feel inferior, alienated and 
withdrawn, he said. Separatist tendencies were an indication 
that they had little desire for nationhood or belonging to a 
state, which was Jinked to their low level of education, he 
said. [Jaka.rta Post October 23, 1990] 
Yali men, West Papua. Photo: Owen Jelpke. 
Abinowo later stressed development over military action, 
as the answer to these 'separatist tendencies'. "We cannot 
eliminate them by killing the people. The only way to 
defeat the idea is through development." He said the OPM 
and other separatist movements used the ethnic issue and 
the gap between Jiving conditions in Irian Jaya and other 
provinces to instigate hatred of the government among the 
common people, university students and intellectuals. The 
unusual allusion to 'other separatist movements' contrasts 
with the usual practice of labelling all anti-Indonesian 
activity as OPM-inspired. 
Abinowo went on to say that the creation of a united 
Melanesian nation was impossible - "They're dreaming. 
Look what happened at Bougainville" - and that the ethnic 
issue was not valid: None of the countries in the world 
purely. consist ~f one ethnic group ... Besides, history shows 
that Irian Jaya is part of Indonesia. Nothing can change it." 
[Jaka.rta Post October 26, 1990] 
OPM kidnap missionaries 
~n Novem~er 19, a group of OPM resistance fighters 
kidnapped six people - two western missionaries a PNG 
official and three Filipino construction workers - 'during a 
raid on the patrol post of Amanab, about 40 km into PNG 
from the border. 
The OPM group, reportedly led by Mr Hans Bomai 
demanded that the PNG minister for provincial affairs, ' 
6 TAPOL Bulletin No. 102, December 1990 
Father John Momis, and the Minister for Justice, Mr 
Bernard Narakobi, fly to Amanab to discuss independence 
plans. They also demanded that no troops be sent in. The 
PNG government sent in troops under an operation code-
named 'Shooting Star' and imposed a curfew and ordered 
journalists to leave Amanab, where they regained control of 
the airstrip from the OPM group. Other Papua New Guinea 
patrol stations were put on alert for increased activity by 
OPM groups. Both the government and the mission group 
said they had received assurances that no harm would come 
to the hostages. PNG's prime minister Rabbie Namaliu 
urged the OPM to hand over the hostages immediately, or 
face "the full consequences of their actions." [sources: The 
Age, 21 November; AP, Reuter 20 November] 
The kidnapping is clearly an attempt to bring to the 
world's attention, the desperate situation now facing West 
Papuans who oppose the Indonesian annexation of their 
country. PNG's strategy to actively support Indonesia's 
moves to crush this opposition by extraditing OPM suspects 
and agreeing to conduct joint border operations, has placed 
the Jives of West Papuan refugees living in the PNG camps 
in grave danger. 
Indonesia: border incursion was 11 accidental 11 
Over the past few months, Indonesian troops made a series 
of incursions into PNG in pursuit of OPM, during which a 
number of Papuans, some believed to be Papua New 
Guineans were killed [see TAPOL Bulletin 101). According 
to reports in the PNG press, troops surrounded a PNG 
government post in which West Papuans were taking 
refuge, and an attack was only avoided by the arrival of 
PNG troops. 
Now Indonesia has answered Michael Somare's letter of 
protest with the claim that the incursion was an accident. A 
diplomatic note presented to PNG Foreign Affairs officials 
on September 25, more than one month after the main 
incursion, admitted that troops crossed into PNG in pursuit 
of OPM, but said the crossing was not a deliberate act, it 
was "accidental". The Indonesian government would always 
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of PNG, and 
wished to maintain lasting friendly relations with PNG. 
Indonesia "deeply appreciates the firm measures taken by 
the PNG government against the terrorist elements in the 
border area," said the note, going on to point out that "close 
cooperation between the two countries will prevent future 
incidents recurring. "[Post Courier September 26, 1990) * 
PKI exiles can return ••• to face trial 
President Suharto has announced that PK/ members in exile will be allowed to return to Indonesia but 
will have to account for their actions before a court of law. Far from being a generous gesture to 
thousands of Indonesian citizens forced into exile for more than a quarter of a century, the 
announcement once again shows Suharto in his true light as merciless persecutor of anyone connected 
to the Indonesian Communist Party. 
Suharto made the announcement on the way home from 
Hanoi after an international tour which had also taken him 
to Beijing. He said that these people must go before the 
courts to ensure that justice would be done. "If they are 
able to convince the courts that they are not guilty, they 
may possibly go free." He said there were no more PKI 
prisoners in Indonesia except those serving sentences. 
The president actually alleged that ex-PKI prisoners who 
had served their sentences now live freely in Indonesia. 
[See below.) He compounded this lie by saying: "If they 
expect to come home and have an easy time of it, that 
wouldn't be fair on the other former PKI members who 
have been brought to justice for their deeds, and some of 
whom are still serving sentences." 
In truth, over 95 per cent of the hundreds of thousands 
held following October 1965 were never "brought to 
justice", if that is what Suharto calls trying people before 
anti-subversion courts or special military tribunals whose 
sole purpose was to pin the blame for the events of October 
1965 on the outlawed, silenced and decimated PKI. 
A gesture to Beijing 
The announcement has far more relevance to Indonesia's 
relationship with China foJlowing the restoration of · dip lo-
matic ties in September. According to Suharto, a clarifica-
tion of his government's treatment of PKI people was 
necessary, to improve understanding not only with the 
Chinese government but also with the Chinese Communist 
Party. During his discussions with senior Chinese leaders, 
he was asked by Ziang Zhemin, general secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party, whether the remaining PKI 
exiles in China would be a11owed home. They were elderly 
and ailing and have never been allowed to engage in 
activities against Indonesia because they are treated as 
aliens, Suharto was assured. 
There are many thousands of Indonesian political exiles 
abroad. Most of those who were in China in the late 60s 
and early 70s have left and are now living in the Nether-
lands or Germany. Having been forced to remain in exile 
for so Jong, many cut off from their closest relatives, it is 
difficult to imagine queues forming outside Indonesian 
embassies for the privilege of facing trial back home and, 
even if acquitted, living out the last years of their lives as 
fifth-rate citizens. 
According to Brig-General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, head 
of information at the armed forces headquarters, all PKI 
exiles are certain to be classified at least as Category-B 
which means they are deemed "to have been clearly 
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involved directly or indirectly in the G30S/PKI". [Hundreds 
of thousands of Category-B prisoners were held for years 
without trial.] Those given Category-A status would be 
considered seriously ,enough 'involved' to be brought to 
trial. Nurhadi said any exiles who return "will be met at the 
airport and thereafter subjected to a 'Jitsus' test", a special 
investigation to determine the level of their ideological 
commitment. [Tempo, 1 December 1990] 
Basuki: General amnesty 
Basuki Resobowo, artist and communist, who has been 
Jiving in exile since 1965, told TAPOL that the only 
circumstance under which he would return home would be 
if a general amnesty were declared for aJJ people aJJeged to 
have been involved in the October 1965 affair. This should 
include unconditional rehabilitation for aJJ the children of 
so-caJJed 'ex-tapols' and the quashing of aJJ sentences 
against those still in prison, including the seven men under 
sentence of death. Apart from the righteousness of such an 
amnesty, Basuki said that only in such circumstances would 
he feel protected against possible persecution and arrest. 
Basuki Resobowo Tempo, 1 December 1990 
In his early years as a painter, Basuki was associated with 
weJJ-established painters J~e Affandi, Sudjojono, Soedarso 
and Soerono but when the leftwing cultural workers' 
organisation, Lekra, was set up, he joined as an executive 
member and was for many years active in the PKI. 
Basuki spent the first years of exile in China. He was 
there in 1965 to process a film he had made on the May 
1965 celebration of the 45th anniversary of the PKI. Before 
he could return home, the persecution and massacre of the 
PKI had began, forcing him to stay in China. Unhappy with 
the isolation imposed on exiles in China, he left for western 
Europe in 1972, hoping to live in the Netherlands. After 
years of unsettled existence in West Germany, he was 
granted political asylum in Holland and now lives and 
paints in a tiny studio in Amsterdam. Among his recent 
paintings is one depicting the struggle of Kedung Ombo 
peasants and one dedicated to the death-sentence prisoners. 
Hunger striker at 76 
Although 76, Basuki took part in a hunger-strike staged 
earlier this year in the centre of Amsterdam to protest the 
execution of six political prisoners and urge the Dutch 
government to press Jakarta not to execute the ren:iaining 
death-sentence prisoners. The initiative 1.0 organise ~e 
hunger strike came from radical Indonesian .students ~ 
Holland but of all the older generation PKI exiles, Basuki 
was one of the few to respond positively and eage~ly · He 
believes that the action was an importa~t land~a::; ~ d~~w 
widespread media attention to the ph~ht 0 ~ bea ll 
sentence victims and the injustices still suffere y a 
communist suspects in Indonesia. . . . 
H. :~ t daughters and two grandchildren hve m IS wue, WO • :~ ft 
Jakarta. In the early days of his exile, his ~ue was o en 
pestered by the security authorities, but has smce been able 
to stabilise her life. When they met some years ago, t~e 
family advised him not to return h~me, partly be~ause this 
might disrupt the conditions in which they now hve. 
"Suharto washing his blood-soaked hands" 
Asked what he made of Suharto's recent vi~it to Chi~a and 
Vietnam Basuki said Suharto wants to obtam absolutmn for 
his blood-soaked regime's extermination ~f the comm.u~ist 
movement in Indonesia from the world s two remammg 
'leftwing' regimes and get these countries' approval ~or the 
destruction of a political force that threatened the exis~ence 
of the Indonesian State, all in the name of the Pan.casila. 
[Source: TAPOL interview, with additional matenal from 
Tempo, 1 December 1990] 
'ET' status challenged 
While Suharto played his sick joke on thousands of poli~ical 
exiles, a group of villagers in Boyolali were hopmg, 
through the courts, to clear their names and have "ET" 
status removed from their identity cards. "ET" stands for 
ex-tapol or former political prisoner but in the Orwellian 
nightmare of official Indonesia's blind hatred for commu-
nists, you don't need to have been a political priso~er to 
become a former political prisoner. All you need do is take 
a stand against officialdom, which is what happened when 
villagers objected to the paltry compensation offered for 
their land expropriated to make way for the World Bank-
funded Kedung Ombo dam. To their amazement, when they 
submitted their identity cards for routine renewal, they 
founded the dreaded initials stamped on the new cards. 
After repeated attempts to have the initials removed, they 
decided to sue the two officials responsible. Two of the 22 
villagers affected told the court that with "ET" identity 
cards, they have encountered insurmountable difficulties in 
obtaining official documents at all levels of the administra-
tion. [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 4 September 1990] 
There are 1.4 million Indonesians whose identity cards 
bear these initials and who suffer the iniquities of this 
inhuman form of discrimination. Returning exiles would 
suffer the same fate. 
The district and sub-district chiefs who are being sued 
have argued in their defence that it has now been ascer-
tained (after 25 years) that the villagers were members of 
PKI-affiliated organisation. "How can we be accused of 
lacking humanitarianism? We did what we did in order to 
prevent the re-emergence of communism and the PKI on 
Indonesian soil." [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 4 October 1990] 
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Shanana speaks 
The following is part of an interview of Shanana Gusmao, commander of F alintil, given to Robert 
Domm, which took place in a guerrilla camp in the interior of East Timor, on 27 September 1990. 
Some answers were given orally while others were given in writing. (Although the guerrilla leader 
signs his name with an x; he said he would pref er it to be spelt 'Shanana' in English documents.) 
On the war 
Following Indonesia's announcement to 'open up' East 
Timor, has the resistance movement made changes in its 
strategy? Have ABRI (the Indonesian armed forces) 
changed their strategy and tactics? 
Any initiatives taken by the occupier invariably have a 
boomerang effect. None of their threats or manoeuvres ever 
scare us because our principle has always been, never to be 
defeated by anything forced upon us by the enemy but to 
explore all possibilities. This means that every advantage 
we reap is the result of a methodical assessment of the 
situation thrust upon us. Because we are always in a 
position of subordination to the enemy's strategy, we have 
never been driven by a desire to engage in frontal combat, 
trying to create obstacles that would prevent the enemy 
from achieving their aims. Our way of thinking is: To 
resist is to win. The nature and dynamism of this principle 
stems from the attention we devote to consolidating and 
continuing the resistance; this is what has given us the 
serenity we need to cope with the difficulties we have had 
to face. 
Some people think we are incapable of thwarting the 
enemy's plans and see this as evidence of our inadequacy. 
We do not think it necessary to obstruct something simply 
for the sake of being obstructive. We believe there is a 
much greater necessity - to prevent the enemy from 
benefiting in any way from their plans. Hence we can say 
that we exist in the shadow of the enemy's plans. As 
everyone knows, "the day belongs to the Javanese, the night 
belongs to the guerrillas". 
Whenever the enemy devises a strategy in any field of 
activity, it goes without saying that they will greatly 
underestimate the possibility for us to take our share of the 
benefits they intended for themselves. To this day, the 
enemy persists in wrongly assessing the Maubere attitude; 
they fail to realise that the war which has been forced on us 
for the last 15 years has unified and consolidated the 
people. Moreover, there is no way out for them. They 
cannot escape the inevitable: any attempt on their part to 
create a situation favourable to them, creates another 
situation that is unfavourable. The very nature of the 
supremacy they impose on us means that they can only 
correct one mistake by committing others. 
It is a vicious circle; something that initially looks like a 
stroke of genius will lose its shine in the end because of the 
numerous small failures at the heart of their strategy, many 
of which they are not even aware of. Things then move in 
the opposite direction to what they had intended, forcing 
them to devise new methods so as to improve their conduct 
of the war. 
With regard to 'opening up', while Jakarta continues to 
celebrate a propaganda victory, the Maubere resistance has 
used every opportunity to adapt to the changes introduced. 
We have benefited much more from this policy than they 
have. Many of our gains have gone undetected and have 
reinforced the foundations of Maubere resistance. We have 
never been over-awed by the initial brilliance of the 
enemy's successes as they appear to the outside world 
however virtuous they seem. 
Shanana Gusmao. Photo: Robert Domm. 
The final aim of ABRI's strategy has not changed. 
However, if by strategy you mean the policies they adopt 
to reach that goal, there have been changes. At first, the 
army wanted a speedy end to the war. Today however, 
although the enemy's conduct of the war is more effective, 
their strategy has shifted towards one that corresponds with 
our strategy of a protracted war. 
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How do the Indonesian troops conduct their operations 
against the Resistance? 
[After describing the changing tactics used by the 
Indonesians in 1981, 1983-4, 1986-7 and 1988, Shanana 
went on to describe how the army uses the population.] 
They cover an area with the people, and then attack another 
area. Then they move and in this way they practically cover 
everywhere. The population is used to cover the terrain, so 
that they push us into the Indonesian forces. The Indonesian 
troops are ready. They are covered by the population, they 
push us, they force us to clash with the troops. If we enter 
into their circle, then we would not be able to leave safely 
in time. 
What are the current tactics of the Indonesian army? 
Now they are using territorial counter insurgency. They 
send out small groups in every direction in a particular 
area ... so that we are constantly in armed clashes with these 
small groups. From time to time, they use larger forces 
which spread out by zones, in each region. Where there are 
bigger Falintil forces, they use a larger number of troops, 
supported by counter insurgency troops. This is the current 
military situation. 
If you want to better understand counter insurgency, I 
would say it has the following purpose: it spreads 
throughout a large area; it has a great capacity for mobilit~, 
to quickly detect the presence of guerrillas. Th~ ~ak~s it 
very difficult for the guerrillas to take their own 1mttatlves. 
We don't have a permanent, fixed enemy with real volume 
or quantity, and we don't know what to confront. We feel 
that the enemy is everywhere; we even say that we carry 
the enemy in our bags. They have improved their technical 
knowledge of guerrilla tactics; at the sign of the presence of 
guerrillas, they chase them until they provoke an armed 
clash. This is different from their previous tactics when they 
used many troops in a fixed period. 
In Australia we heard many reports of atrocities by 
Indonesian troops in the past Did the Indonesian troops 
adopt those tactics in your experience? 
Yes, particularly against the Resistance. The Indonesian 
troops do not behave in any other way. They chop off the 
heads of the guerrillas, they torture them on the spot. For 
instance, if a guerrilla is wounded and captured, he is 
killed; recently, at the beginning of September, a guerrilla 
in the eastern sector was wounded and taken to a village 
and killed. 
Can you explain, sir, what types of military equipment 
the Indonesian troops use against the Resistance? 
Lately, we have not seen the brand name which we saw 
earlier on all the equipment and weaponry, which all bore 
the brand name of NATO. They also use Bronco OV-lOs, 
Robert Domm explains a point during his 12-hour interview with Shanana Gusmao. Two cassettes were recording the 
conversation, one brought by Domm and one owned by the gue"illa leader. 
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Skyhawks, Tigers and other aircraft. They use M16s and 
ARlSs. 
I might just explain for the tape that Mr Shanana is 
showing me an automatic rifle captured from the 
Indonesian troops, and on the other side of the rifle are 
the words: "Property of the US Government, Ml6Al 
Calibre 5.S 6mm and the serial number is 532 0696" 
and the rifle is made by Colts Firearms, Colt Industries, 
Hartford, Connecticut, USA. It's a semi-automatic. 
Lately they use this one, not ARlS, it is similar, but it's an 
M16, the others are AR15s. This is what the Indonesian 
troops use. 
Mr Shanana, what effect does the war between your 
troops and the Indonesians have on the civilians? 
I would say horrendous. The war has caused many deaths 
and great suffering for our people. All the atrocities you 
hear about outside are only a tiny part of what actually 
happens in East Timor. lt is really difficult to tell you the 
extent of the impact. But since we say that the peoples' 
resistance continues, this is the true effect of this war. 
There have been reports in Australia that maybe 
100,000 civilians have died through fighting and through 
famine or disease? 
I believe that it is more than 200,000. 
Sir, you have commented on your military strategies in 
the current situation. Could you comment in a bit more 
detail on your offensive capabilities? 
Militarily,_ we are very realistic. We don't dream of great 
military offensives; we cannot do that. Our strategy is 
conditioned by the occupiers' strategy. That's why our motto 
is: "To resist is to win", not 'to annihilate them is to win'. 
Mr Shanana can you describe for me the difficulties of 
conducting a war of resistance in East Timor, given the 
communication problems you have and the problems 
associated with the difficult terrain, the mountains? 
The question is interesting; the communications factor is 
very important. The guerrillas in East Timor do not have 
any means to enable us quickly to have a view of the 
evolving military situation throughout the country. Lately, 
we have had even more difficulties because of the nature of 
the enemy's activities, territorial counter insurgency. But the 
clandestine organisations have been able to warn us in 
advance. We must be the only guerrilla army in the world 
with so many difficulties in alJ aspects - our own 
subsistence, in health, in ou! own capacity to maintain 
adequate human resources. · 
But we must stress, it is our political motivation that 
sustains us in this war, it is too great for us to lose, our 
morale is unshakeable. It is this morale that allows us to 
overcome all these difficulties. In such a small territory 
hardly visible on the map, with a tiny air space and sea 
surrounding us on all sides and a naval blockade imposed 
by the enemy, everyone can understand the difficulties 
faced by Falintil. The fact that we have resisted for 15 
years now and we are stiJJ able to cry out that we are 
determined to win is because our people demand this, our 
homeland demands this of us. People should understand that 
for us the enormous difficulties are not really felt, they only 
strengthen our unity, our determination to search for new 
methods to face up to these difficulties. 
Without sanctuaries, our guerrillas are very mobile in the 
full sense of that word. Without even the minimum capacity 
EASTTIMOR 
to create production zones to supply ourselves and which 
we can defend, without the minimum conditions to acquire 
a piece of land, build a small factory to make our own 
clothing, you can understand our difficulties. Mr Robert, 
you cannot see these problems here because my men wear 
good civilian clothing sent by our parents, brothers and 
sisters, our children in the underground resistance. 
On the Indonesian army 
What is your assessment of the fighting capacity of the 
Indonesian armed forces? 
In our opinion, the Indonesian armed forces are worthless. 
What we note is that the '1945 generation', most of them 
white-haired Javanese, have only wanted to wage war 
against 'communist rebels'. These generals are not soldiers, 
they are fanatics. They have learned a Jot from the war in 
East Timor but only about fighting subversion. Their 
military might rests on the fact that they can send an 
Indonesian soldier into battle with a full round of 
ammunition, as compared to our Falintil guerrillas who 
always go into battle with a single bullet in their gun. 
A technically well-prepared guerrilla army with the bare 
minimum of ammunition for its men can always defeat the 
generals from Jakarta on the field of battle. The antiquated 
OV-10 Broncos proved very successful in East Timor as 
did the Skyhawks. But even without radar, they could have 
been shot down with a single missile! In the August issue 
of TAPOL Bulletin, we read about the war that has started 
in Aceh. I can believe that. ABRI's morale has been 
undermined by the war in East Timor. If this has been a 
training ground, the training has been very costly. 
The essential factor for any guerrilla movement is strong 
political motivation. This is the foundation, the basic 
prerequisite, for our unshakeable morale. Another vital 
point is, having confidence in the availability of human 
reinforcements. Our strategy of 'resolving things through 
war' makes a regular supply of ammunition essential. The 
weapons are bound to come, for which we have Benny 
Murdani to thank. Another important thing is to take 
advantage of the enemy's contradictions. As I have said the 
. ' Indonesian armed forces are worthless. They lack what the 
guerrillas have in plenty, while that which they possess is 
taken from them by the guerrillas. 
Falintil's politics 
What is your organisation's political philosophy? Some 
people claim that you are communists? Is this true? 
No, i~ is. not true. It is true that years ago we took up a 
Marxist ideology, but to say that we are communists today 
is not so, because at the right time we revised our thinking. 
I cannot deny facts that are histQry, that Fretilin at one time 
might have taken up the communist ideology. Today we all 
declare that this belongs to the past. I myself created a 
Marxist-Leninist party, transforming the Fretilin movement 
into a party, but very soon I realised that that ideology did 
not serve us. So we changed our previous thinking and 
enabled Fretilin to regain its former nationalist character. 
Today, not being a member of Fretilin myself, [ believe that 
the differences between the nationalist parties are not that 
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great. If you ask what my political philosophy is, [it is] 
onJy the Jiberation of my country. 
I understand at this moment that poJitics in the larger 
sense of the political nature of the resistance, is taken up by 
all the children of East Timor. The political philosophy of 
Falintil is patriotism, a nationalist philosophy. 
Robert Domm with a group of Failintil guerrillas. 
The unarmed resistance 
How well organised is the underground in the towns, the 
resistance underground and how does it work? 
We cannot say clearly how the underground organisation 
works as this would harm the resistance. But we can say 
that the underground organisation is now at an unsurpassed 
level, at a level for which we've been striving for the past 
15 years. There are popular organisations at every 
concentration camp. Even in Oe Cusse there are 
organisations, in Suai, Bobonaro, Maliana, Liquica, and 
Ermera, areas where at the moment we don't have a military 
presence, but we have underground organisations. 
When we talk about the concentration camps, we mean 
the small villages in the more remote countryside as well as 
in the towns and even Dili. Dili is the centre of clandestine 
activities - the engine of underground activities. The enemy 
knows this, it is no secret. The level of the underground 
organisation enables us to affirm once again that if Jakarta 
continues to be inflexible, the war will not end soon. 
How important to you are the Timorese students? 
The role of these students is of great significance, especially 
those who have graduated and have the intellectual capacity 
to understand the problems. They have not abandoned the 
Maubere people. The Maubere people are not disappointed 
with the position taken by their children. Their importance 
lies essentially in the fact that they can better understand 
the essence of the peoples' problems. It is not convenient to 
talk about the way they are organised. What we can say is 
that they are completely organised. They all live up to their 
responsibilities to their homeland, and they are mobilised to 
take practical actions in the struggle. 
What role does the Catholic Church play in East Timor 
today? 
A very important role though from the outside it might be 
difficuJt to fuJJy appreciate it. The Catholic Church in. J?ast 
Timor has played an essentially moral as well as a. pohtical 
role, and is involved in the popular resistance. This almost 
unseen action by the Church is deeply felt by our people, 
because it also supports our resistance. The clergy play an 
indirect but very committed role; actions by the Church 
have strengthened the popuJar, patriotic consciousness and 
helped the people see that we are Maubere people who 
have nothing in common with the Indonesians. The Church 
has not spoken out openly, but acts with prudence so as to 
continue to be on the peoples' side. 
So, the Church has an enormous influence; increasingly 
the people have great trust in the Catholic Church because 
it is not isolated from their suffering. Priests' lives have 
been threatened, for example Father Joao de Deus. Father 
Locate11i has been interrogated and beaten up many times. 
We recently learned that a priest was interrogated, but the 
clergy did not get directly involved, only giving advice on 
what action to take. 
Life under Indonesian rule 
Can you describe life under Indonesian rule? 
In Indonesian controlled areas the people are not healthy, 
not because they don't have enough to eat, but as a result of 
the constant fear of the Indonesian presence. 
Do you disagree with the Australian government when 
it says that the human rights situation has improved? 
There are two points of view corrupted by the interests of 
the Australian government. For the Timorese in general, if 
things have improved in the sense that they can buy an item 
of clothing, this does not mean that the situation has 
improved for the majority. They are still malnourished. 
More interestingly, many schools are losing students 
because the parents cannot keep their children at school. 
They go for the first 3 or 4 years but no longer. Materially, 
foreigners might see some light in Dili. If they think East 
Timor is Dili, then maybe materially some Timorese are 
better off, but if they think East Timor is not only Dili, then 
materialJy the people still face a lot of difficulty to survive. 
Economically, we should consider the interests of the 
generals in Jakarta; for instance, General Benny Murdani 
has an interest in the exploitation of coffee. Because of the 
proliferation of people coming from Jakarta, our people 
cannot keep up with the prices imposed by the occupier. 
The Maubere people are confined to smaJJ pieces of land to 
cultivate, not capable of providing a proper existence. 
You will have noticed beautiful houses which are the 
product of the people's effort. The occupier distributed roofs 
for instance, but they charge for it which makes our people 
angry, resentful. They gave us zinc to cover our homes and 
now they want us to pay but how can we do that? What 
they have introduced does not satisfy our people, and does 
not conform with the previous economic life of our people. 
If the Timorese do not benefit, who does? 
The generals. It is said often that General Benny Murdani 
has economic interests here. They are the first to benefit. 
Secondly, those who come here to take most government 
jobs. Dili is full of Javanese making money while working 
as civil servants. Thirdly, the transmigrants are themselves 
poor people; they themselves say 'we are poor' and 'it's our 
government that sent us here', although they are happy to 
come. They even say that if Fretilin wins they don't want to 
leave. The government gives aU the facilities to these 
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people; the so-called new method of agriculture is for 
them. The transmigrants are settled in fertile areas, whose 
real owners are Timorese who have been forced into 
concentration camps for security reasons. When these 
transmigrants come, they can sell their produce from which 
they profit. They can travel freely on paved roads, travel 
freely in the thousands of cars brought here. 
It's said that women suffer more than men. Can you 
comment on that, and on the role women play in the 
resistance? 
The horrors of war are felt particularly acutely by the 
women, who feel even more oppressed than the men. There 
are so many cases - violations, abuses, threats - they are 
widely known, and they take place from . Tutuala [in the far 
east) to the border region. An entire platoon raping a 
woman, sexually abusing her until she's almost dead. Many 
give their lives, preferring a bullet to dishonour, while 
others who are weaker or pursued by a large number of 
troops, are unable to resist. They are bestial, assassins, 
inhuman. For them anything Maubere is to be violated, 
oppressed and killed. This is the situation of Timorese 
women. 
To describe the role of Timorese women as something 
separate from men would mean dividing the resistance into 
two fronts, which is inconceivable. The only thing we do 
not allow our women to do is carry arms, because we still 
have men. But, on a par with men, they contributed in the 
most dangerous years of 1979 to 1981 and other difficult 
periods from 1983 to 1985, when the enemy directed 
reprisals against men and the Timorese women knew how 
to respond. They were the last stronghold of the resistance 
when the men were not allowed to move about. 
On the international front 
The visit to East Timor of a Portuguese parliamentary 
mission has been postponed again because Jakarta fears 
it will unleash demonstrations. It seems the visit is being 
used by Jakarta to trick Portugal and delay discussion 
at the UN about self-determination. What is your 
opinion? 
I agree. Jakarta's intentions are unmistakeable. 
I would agree to the territory being placed under a UN 
administration as the first step towards seeking a final 
solution, under certain indispensable conditions. I think it 
is our duty to confront the problem more realistically than 
"I am interested in discussing any plan 
for a solution, without preconditions, 
under the supervision of the 
United Nations " 
hitherto and since we were the ones to opt for war, we 
should be the ones to set out the terms of peace. 
I think that the statement by Rafeeuddin Ahmed, deputy 
secretary-general of the UN, recently published in Lisbon 
[see box] needs careful analysis. He says that the UN 
interprets the East Timor question within the Asian context, 
and wrongly compares the situation of Macau and 
Hongkong with East Timor. Such a generalization is 
inadequate since war has been raging in East Timor 
between Jakarta and the Maubere people for 15 years. 
Because of this, Portugal cannot exercise its powers as the 
administering power of a territory over which it does not 
even exert minimum control. 
There would need to be a revised interpretation of who 
the interested parties are, because, whereas the UN's 
interpretations are specific and conditional and not based on 
universal principles, Maubere resistance to the military 
occupation of their country means that it is the people of 
East Timor, not Portugal, who are the legitimate party to 
negotiate an end to the conflict. I have already stated and 
will repeat, that I am interested in discussing any plan for 
a solution, without pre-conditions, under the supervision of 
the United Nations (for the solution reached to have the 
backing of the UN and to respect UN principles) and under 
conditions of a cease-fire. 
· .... ~ Rafeeuddl~ ·Ahnied on .. East Timor ·. 
· fu ·.· a meeting with Japa~ese MP, Takemura Yasuko~ 
in New York onAugust 8, the UN deputy secretary'-
general With special responsibi]ify for East Timor, W ' 
. Rafe~uddiII .AJulled; eXplairied ···· th¢ ·differirig . views at .·•··· .. 
the . llN r¢gardmg $e1f~determination . for fomier . 
cofonial territories: .•. . . . . . . . .·. . •... · 
... · ~ile in Afi"ica~ he said, the trend is to support ·tlie .·.·. 
c maintenance of .the cofonial borders, . in Asia· it is not ... · 
·· ·· He said the trend ·among Asiari eountri~ is to seek}> 
•.· th.e unificaHoi) of tertjfories th~t w~re separated by . 
. · • coioniCllism: For exalliple; China, . Macau and' Jiong :> 
... Kong ~e being reunited now and no one ·objectsDTbe <( 
H .. same for · Malaysfa; .this . is seen as .. the .unifying 'b!En 
.·. areas lhat were tc>nnerly one; but were clivided :by'tt 
·. 5~::~t;~::.:w7~~Zn:~JI 
Lisbon· daily, Publico, on 4 September 1990~} .... 
On the pro-democracy 
movement in Indonesia 
How do you assess the pro-democracy movement in 
Indonesia? Do you see prospects for collaboration 
between that movement and the movements for national 
liberation in East Timor and West Papua? 
It is difficult to anticipate a common platform because this 
movement has only just begun to be a mass movement. The 
slogan "from Sabang to Merauke" is a Pancasila-ist 
doctrine and as a colonised country, we well understand the 
strength of this colonial principle. But I noticed in a recent 
issue of TAPOL Bulletin that a leading Indonesian dissident 
has acknowledged the relationship between East Timor and 
the spirit of Indonesian expansionism. [This refers to the 
defence plea of Bandung student Ammarsyah - see TAPOL 
Bulletin No 98.) 
We hope the movement in Indonesia understands our 
struggle and appreciates that true democracy can only be 
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achieved by recognising the basic rights of aJJ pe~p]e. . 
Regarding coUaboration between movements with qm~e 
distinct features such as the pro-democracy movement m 
Indonesia and the nationalist movements in territories which 
now "be]ong to" lndonesia, I think this is possible as Jong 
as everyone understands the iJJegality of what t~ok .pla~e 
and the criminaJ methods used to make these temtones a 
part" of Indonesia. We would weJcoi;xie with open arms ~ny 
sign of a will to unite forces and reinforce efforts to brmg 
changes in present-day society, while respecting the mutual 
interests of all sides. Collaboration should be firmly based 
on princip]es. 
Constructive dialogue needed 
What is your message to the world, in particular 
regarding the international position of East Timor? 
After 15 years of a difficult struggle, we are more than ever 
convinced that only constructive dialogue can pave the way 
to a new era of peace, justice and liberty which the world 
community is striving to create on earth. 
For 15 years, the East Timorese people have lived under 
an injustice, based on the tota] lack of respect of universal 
princip]es. Some people talk about differences of principle 
between what has happened in Kuwait and East Timor. 
They argue for self-determination for Afghanistan, 
Cambodia and now Kuwait because they are sovereign 
countries whereas East Timor did not, judicially speaking, 
fall under this category. Ironically those who defend this 
indefensible thesis admit that the way East Timor was 
annexed does not conform with the norms set for non-seJf-
governing territories, implicitly recognising that the 
invasion and military occupation of East Timor is illegal. 
As regards the violation of borders, the use of force and 
so on, vis-a-vis self-determination, Kuwait is a carbon 
copy of what happened in East Timor. This is why we are 
puzzled by the statement of the UN deputy secretary-
general, Rafeeuddin Ahmed, who introduced geographic 
interpretations in discussing self-determination. This can 
only diminish the universal validity of these principles and 
make the UN look like a government that interprets its 
programme on the basis of its own special interests. We 
believe that the principle of self-determination is an eternal 
principle, without which other Kuwaits will succeed. 
Raf eeuddin Ahmed's warped interpretation of a basic UN 
principle will only encourage expansionist ambitions 
between sovereign territories which can easily discover 
historical ties of one kind or another to invalidate the 
divisions between countries separated by colonialism. Iraq 
asserts that Kuwait was always a part of Iraq but was 
separated by colonialism. In response, the UN has stood up 
in defence of its universal principles, and created a "desert 
shield" because the Middle East is not Asia. 
According to this geographical interpretation, we can now 
expect Pakistan to reserve the right to chalJenge the colonial 
borders of Kashmir and the UN will not be able to create 
an "Asian shield" . Under the protection of such an 
interpretation, lndonesia will hardly be able to wait to grab 
Papua New Guinea. That, of aH places, is a real farce 
because it was colonialism which drew the border down the 
middle of the huge Papuan island. Elsewhere in Asia, 
nobody will be able to comment about the complaints of 
the Tibetans, because the Asian context rejects the right of 
self-determination and confers the right of reclaiming 
territories to big states which have po~er:· ·a~d oil. Ir~q is 
in Kuwait because of oil and Indonesia is m East T1mor 
because of oil. 
Rafeeuddin Ahmed takes no account of the fact that there 
are major differences between Macau and Hongkong on the 
one hand, and East Timor. The pacts that allow~d Portugal 
and England the right of a physical presence m the two 
territories do not apply to East Timor; there was no such 
pact between Portugal and Indonesia, a country then under 
domination and now the continuation of a Dutch colony. 
The agreements that have given Peopl~'s C~in~ sovereignty 
over the two territories were entered mto m light of those 
pacts. In East Timor, the Mauber~ people contin~e to resist 
the invasion and military occupatrnn by Indonesia. 
In spite of all this, the Maubere people are convin~ed_ that 
the correct way to resolve conflicts where world pnnc1ples 
are at stake is dialogue. We believe that the tenaci_ous 
defence of democracy and human rights has today acqmred 
a universal validity. In today's changing world, genuine 
change can only occur when all the people of the :vorld 
benefit from the universal values of freedom and nghts. 
Although the free world now celebrates the dismantling of 
the iron curtain there still are people, in particular the sma11 
and defencele;s, who are at the mercy of the mighty 
ambitions of the strong and powerful. 
We shall continue to defend dialogue in the case of East 
Timor and are convinced that dialogue between the 
interested parties, including the resistance movement, will 
reconcile the interests of alJ. We will take into account the 
interests of Jakarta but only dialogue can iron out the 
difficulties and indicate a possible solution. 
We appeal to all to press Jakarta to search for a solution 
by negotiation, because we believe this is the only way to 
safeguard the interests of each and every one. We hope 
that Jakarta will demonstrate its political maturity. We 
repeat that we are prepared at any time to enter into talks, 
under the auspices of the United Nations, about any plan 
for a solution, without pre-conditions, obviously under 
conditions of a cease fire. 
On the Timor Gap Treaty 
What do you think about Australia's policy on East 
Tim or? 
Australia has adopted the attitude of accomplice to genocide 
by the occupation forces; the interests it wants to secure 
from Indonesia's annexation of East Timor are obvious. The 
best proof in the Tim or Gap Treaty. It is inconceivable that 
a democratic country with a western way of life, claiming 
to defend human rights, should profit from the blood of 
other people, a small neighbour that has not forgotten the 
role it played in defence of Australia when so many 
Timorese died fighting the Japanese. We feel betrayed that 
a country with western values should help Indonesian 
propaganda, covering up a tragedy and participating in this 
rapacious exploitation of what is legitimately ours. 
The Timor Gap Treaty is a unilateral, il1egal and criminal 
treaty as we are being extenninated by one of the parties. 
Through this Treaty, Australia has become an accomplice. 
Australia talks loudly about international law, yet this 
Treaty disrespects (international) principles, one of which 
says that no acquisition by force is legal. As far as I know, 
Australia is a signatory to this principle but has contradicted 
it by concluding this treaty with Jakarta. It shows how 
dirty, cynical and criminal the AustraJian government's 
policies are regarding East Timor. * 
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Historic meeting in the bush 
In September, an Australian citizen, Robert Domm, went to East Timar for the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation to interview the guerrilla commander, Shanana Gusmao. After a hazardous trip to the 
bush, he brought back six cassette tapes. The fallowing are extracts from an exclusive report of Domm s 
meeting with Shanana by ABC radio producer, Mark Aarons. 
Climbing a 'mini-Matterhorn' 
The guerrilla officer pointed vaguely and said encou-
ragingly, 'We're very close now. It's just up ahead.' The 
Timorese knew that his Australian companion was just 
about done for. For the past 20 kilometres, the security unit 
had insisted that they travel at a forced march. The rugged 
mountains were literally teeming with Indonesian troops 
patrolling the dense jungle. They knew that the resistance 
leader, Shanana Gusmao was in the area and desperately 
wanted to capture or kill him. 
By then Robert Domm was already exhausted, dripping 
with sweat and covered in a thick coat of mountain dust. 
Damm squinted into the late afternoon light and silently 
groaned. From where the small group was standing at the 
foot of the mountain, it was impossible to tell that anyone 
was there, let alone how to get up it. 
Domm photographed with some of his guerrilla escorts, on 
his way to meet the guerrilla leader. 
A few hours earlier, Domm and his battle hardened 
bodyguards had met just outside a tiny Timorese hamlet. 
Domm's first impression was that they were a somewhat 
rag-tag band. Although they all wore uniforms, no two 
were alike. Some wore 'Afro' hairstyles and each was 
distinctive, far removed from a conventional army's neat-
ness and uniformity. 'My first reaction was: "Oh no, I 
thought these guys were a bit better than this." 
Damm reflected on the traditional Timorese ritual that had 
occurred shortly after they had set out from Dili. Suddenly 
the car had stopped and one of the men asked him to 
unbutton his shirt. His companions at this stage were 
members of the local underground. One produced a green 
leaf, dipped his finger into a supposedly magical substance 
and drew a symbol on Domm's chest and forehead, and 
then repeated the ritual on the others. He explained that 
'now the Indonesians won't see us. We'll be invisible to 
them.' Although Domm joined in with good humour, he 
quietly hoped that they were not putting too much faith in 
this tradition. 
After two days travelling through the inaccessible moun-
tains, the Australian thought twice. They had passed by 
thousands of Indonesian troops, on occasion within metres 
of them, 'but they never saw me'. Perhaps the tradition had 
worked, after all. More likely, the success of Domm's 
mission is explained by the extraordinary, military-like 
precision with which the East Timorese resistance organised 
the mission. Damm is the first outsider to gain an overview 
of the resistance's organisation; others have known parts of 
the network, but he saw first hand how the underground 
operates in the Indonesian-controlled towns and villages, 
and how the guerrillas live in the bush. 
Once out in the bush, Domm realised that his initial 
impression of the guerrilJas was quite wrong. In the 
mountains they rapidly demonstrated their skills as a 
guerrilla army. 'They don't march up and down in military 
parades. They're not like the Indonesian army which is 
trained like that,' Domm reports. 'But in terms of being able 
to get through the mountains at great speed, take the best 
vantage points, liaise with the local people and seize the 
initiative from the Indonesian troops, they are a formidable 
force. 
The first contact for 15 years 
When he reached their camp on top of their 'mini-Matter-
horn', Damm could not see it, even from about 10 metres. 
'Suddenly Shanana emerged, and one of the guerrillas said, 
"There's our leader". I looked up and realised we were 
there. So you can see how difficult it is for the Indonesians 
.to find them.' The last stretch was very steep, and by then 
he was on his hands and knees. He struggled to his feet, 
shook Shanana's hand and said: 'It's been a long time, sir, 
15 years.' The guerrilla legend smiled shyly and simply 
replied: 'Yes.' 
Work on making direct contact with Shanana had been 
under way at the ABC for quite a few years. Earlier this 
year, I met Robert Domm at a function and we talked all 
night about East Timor. As a young man in the 1970s he 
had travelled many times to the Portuguese colony and 
when Jakarta 'normalised' the territory in January 1989, he 
was one of the first to take advantage of the easing of travel 
restrictions and visit as a tourist. 
Domm's three weeks in Indonesia and Timor were 
extremely psychologically demanding. 'I was well aware 
that 6 Australian. media people had been killed by 
Indonesian troops, and that they are anxious to prevent 
infonnation from getting out from the guerrillas. I knew 
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that I'd have to evade the Indonesian anny to get to the 
mountains. Knowing this, there was a real possibility that 
I, and the resistance people travelling with me, wouldn't 
make it back. I had to reconcile myself to the real possibil-
ity that I may have been killed, and that's a very difficult 
thing to do.' 
A well-organised resistance 
Domm found a very different situation from that conveyed 
by the generals in Jakarta. The Indonesians cJaim that the 
situation ·· is nonnal. But it's one of the most abnormal 
societies that I have ever been to. I expected a lot of 
resistance but I never realised that it was all so well 
organised and so extensive. In Dili and in many other towns 
there were numerous people involved in the operation to 
smuggle me to the mountains. Once out of Dili there were 
people everywhere, monitoring our movements at every 
stage, organising and scouting ahead to ensure that we got 
to the anny's base camp and returned safely. That reaUy 
opened my eyes because there are over 10,000 troops in 
that tiny country. We went through them everywhere in the 
mountains and it was only that local network of civilians 
that saved our skins. The small group with me could not 
have protected me from that sort of power. Our only 
protection was the local people, and their bush telegraph. 
It's all word of mouth and foot out there. 
Slipping through undetected 
They desperately needed this netWork to evade the numer-
ous Indonesian patrols, especially the smalJ, well camou-
flaged and mobile patrols hiding in the jungle. 'I saw them 
everywhere on the roads, patrolling on foot, crammed into 
military transport trucks, and travelling in armoured 
vehicJes. Once off the beaten track, they were everywhere, 
and although I couldn't see them, the Timorese could. I was 
a bit like a blind person. I could have walked right over 
them without knowing because they blend in so effectively. 
But the resistance knew where they were, because informa-
tion was passed to the security unit by the local people.' 
To ensure Domm's safety, the guerrillas had spread out all 
along the route. Like the Indonesians, they were simply 
everywhere. They would spring up out of trees and the 
security unit knew exactly where they were hiding. I would 
suddenly see a guerrilla talking to a tree and I'd look round 
and a soldier would suddenly appear from nowhere. 
Shanana's base camp seemed to be ringed with this protec-
tive cordon of fighters and peasants, all looking for signs of 
an Indonesian advance. If one had come, resistance runners 
would have swiftly brought the news.' 
Domm's stay at the camp was by necessity very brief, as 
a clockwork-like plan had been developed to spirit him 
back to Dili. It was a 'no nonsense' 18 hours. After a short 
'breather and a drink of water', they got down to business. 
The guerrilla leader's demeanour changed noticeably 
through the interview. At first somewhat shy and awkward, 
he loosened up and relaxed. 'He hadn't met an outsider for 
15 years; he seemed to have lost an element of the 
"civilised world", if I can call it that. He'd never done an 
interview before and didn't know what to expect, but he 
was an articulate, intelligent and very thoughtful man, who 
answered the questions fully and frankly and very sponta-
neously. He was very honest admitting past mistakes and 
deficiencies. His only reluctance to answer questions was 
that he wanted to avoid exposing the underground 
organisation and put people at risk.' 
A living symbol 
It was now easy for Domm to understand th~ reverence 
with which he had heard Shanana's name ment10ned back 
in Dili The Timorese see him as a living symbol of their 
resistance. To them, he's a precious item, in that Shanana is 
Robert Domm and Shanana Gusmao. 
there in the mountains, and the Indonesians haven't been 
able to capture him in 15 years. Despite all their best 
efforts, throwing as many troops as they could at him, they 
can't get him. With all their sophisticated US technology, he 
continues to survive and mount attacks against them. The 
people in Dili believe there's hope in the hills, it's not all 
bleak, they haven't been totally subjugated, because their 
leader is up there. That's the way they see him, sort of like 
a beacon. He's keeping the flame of freedom alive.' 
At midday on 28 September, Domm left the camp to 
make his dangerous return to Dili. As he packed his small 
shoulder bag, he looked at the tiny Sony Walkman I had 
given him to record the interview. The symbolism seemed 
somehow tragic. 
* * * * * 
The return to Dili cast new light on the 10 agonizing days 
Domm had spent there, waiting under the watchful eye of 
Indonesian security for his trip to begin. He understood 
much more clearly just how well organised the Timorese 
resistance ~re. Wh~e the Indonesians have 'opened up' the 
count~, this has given the underground time and space to 
organise. 
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Dili' s dark underside 
From his many conversations with the local people, he 
discovered 'a dark underside to Dili', a daily battle between 
the security apparatus, especially military intelligence, and 
the underground. 'From what I saw, Indonesian inteJligence 
puts an intense effort into turning people into double agents 
or informants. So the dark underside, which a tourist sitting 
in a nice hotel could easily never see, is this continual 
struggle. It's a nasty, violent, dark underside to the place.' 
As far as Domm could tell, the Indonesians need every 
weapon of terror and surveiJJance to keep the underground 
in check. 'In Dili, it's a classic situation of popular resis-
tance; people in the army, inteJJigence, police, shops, hotels, 
all ostensibly participating in Indonesian rule, are all really 
resistance people, who are regularly providing intelligence 
to the guerrillas in the mountains.' 
It was only on his return to the capital that Domm appre-
ciated just how important the 'men in the bush' are to the 
towns. In the eyes of the Timorese living under the 
Indonesians, 'the guerrillas are not bowing down to any-
body. They live that hard life, but they are standing tall, as 
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they see it. What struck me the most, going back to Dili, 
straight from the guerrillas' camp, was a sense of revulsion 
towards the Indonesians. They suddenly seemed ugly, crass 
and obscene in their attitude and behaviour. I have 
Indonesian friends there who I get on well with, and they 
are basically good people. But they suddenly struck· me as 
being quite ugly, and I wanted to tell them to get out of this 
place.' . 
Robert Domm risked his life to bring the Timorese 
guerrillas' message to world attention. From the comfort and 
safety of Australia, their existence seems a million miles 
away. 'For 15 years they've known only the mountains, and 
while they listen to the world on their short wave radios, 
the world hasn't listened to them. The Indonesians have 
denied them the right to communicate for all that time, and 
stiJI do.' The Australian government has actively assisted 
this censorship, refusing to accept radio messages originat-
ing from the resistance, and seizing several two way radio 
connections established by pro-Timorese Australians. * 
'A sad and terrifying place' 
Conditions in East Timor have recently been described as very grim in a number of reports filed by 
foreign news agencies. According to APP on 29 October, Western, Asian and Pacific diplomats just 
returned from a visit "were stunned by the mood prevailing in Dili". The New York Times [21 October] 
Southeast Asia correspondent, Steve Erlanger filed a report entitled: 'East Timor, reopened by the 
Indonesians, remains a sad and terrifying place. ' 
There are several reasons for the deplorable situation now 
existing in East Timor: 
* The pro-independence demonstration at a mass to 
celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Dili Diocese on 4 
September led to more acts of defiance among Timorese 
youth, who were also responding to many arrests and the 
mat-treatment of detainees. 
* Clashes broke out between troops and school-children 
on two occasions in Dili during October. One occurred after 
a classroom of pupils at a junior high school in Fatumeta 
shouted down an official from the local prosecutor's office 
who lectured them about the Pancasila. A few days later, 
Sao Jose secondary school was raided by troops searching 
for pro-independence literature believed to be on the 
premises. Later, troops were said to be searching for a 
weapon allegedly taken by a youngster during a scuffle. 
* Masked and hooded men have been roaming the streets 
of Dili at night and beating up Timorese youth~, inflicting 
a virtual curlew on the town. These gangs which have not 
been identified but are thought to be from the police, are 
called ninja and are reminiscent of the unidentified death 
squads that killed so many people in the towns and cities of 
Java and Sumatra in 1983-84. 
* There are reports of a major intelligence operation which 
was launched to penetrate and break up the clandestine 
network that so successfully organised Robert Domm's trip 
into the bush to meet resistance leader, Shanana Gusmao. 
There are reports of a number of arrests and unconfirmed 
reports of some deaths. According to APP [28 October 
1990], church sources in Dili said that 45 people were 
arrested between 15 and 26 October. The same source said: 
"Never before has the situation been so terrible or so tense." 
Governor Mario Carrascalao was quoted as denouncing "the 
climate of terror and the actions of the. police whose job is 
to protect the people, not terrorise them". 
Meanwhile, Reuter's Jonathan Thatcher filed two reports 
following a visit to Dili. In the first on 5 November, he too 
found Governor Carrascalao in an angry mood, warning that 
East Timor "could collapse into civil war" if a planned visit 
by Portuguese parliamentarians goes ahead. People are 
going to look at (that) moment as their last opportunity to 
show their feelings, he said. Later, Thatcher quoted a 
church source as saying that "the hatred (towards) Indonesia 
is quite deep". A Timorese told him: "All the people in Dili 
live in terror. This morning a mother told me her son was 
captured yesterday. She doesn't know where he is. Every 
day I receive this sort of information." [Reuter, 18.XI.90] 
Troop build-up 
According to the Sydney Morning Herald [30.X.90), 
Indonesia has increased the number of troops in Dili to 
combat anti-lndonesian protest. The troops have sealed off 
parts of the city and are conducting house-to-house 
searches. Witnesses said they had seen combat-ready troops 
disembarking in Dili from naval landing craft which had 
transported them from Baucau. 
The BBC World Service [29 October] suggested that the 
so-called 'hearts and minds' policy introduced when the 
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present military commander, Brigadier-General Warouw 
took over last December, has been abandoned. The army is 
said to be stepping up its presence in towns and villages in 
a show of strength. 
Parliamentary mission 
Attempts to salvage the planned visit of a Portuguese 
mission from the deadlock reached earlier this year led to 
a decision at the UN in New York for the mission to be 
preceded by a UN preparatory mission, accompanied by 
Portuguese officials. Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
distorted this, claiming that the Portuguese parliamentarians 
visit would go ahead but with UN officials in tow as the 
Portuguese could not be trusted to draw objective con-
clusions. [Kompas, 11 October 1990] 
Sixty infants die in Oe Cusse . 
During September and October ~990, hu~dreds of children 
under five fell ill with severe diarrhoea m Oe Cusse, East 
Timor (an enclave on the north coast . of West ~imor). The 
Jakarta Post [27 October] said that sixty had died t!11'ough 
lack of medication or because they had reached hospital too 
late for treatment. Most of the victims were described as 
being 'undernourished'. 
Family planning 'should be aband~ned' 
Meanwhile birth control officials now admit that the East 
Timorese ~refer large families and say that "the idea that a 
smaller family would bring prosperity should be abandoned 
in East Timor". The report linked the attitude to 'reduced 
population numbers', but implied that this had occurred 
because of 'factional strife'. [Jakarta Post, 20.X.1990] * 
223 members of US Congress sign 
letter on East Timor 
On 19 November, no fewer than 223 members of the House of Representatives, more than half the 
House, wrote to Secretary of State, James Baker, expressing concern about East Timor. The signatories 
include 170 Democrats and 53 Republicans. 
Dear Mr. Secretary: 
We would like to underscore our deep concern over recent 
developments in the former Portuguese colony of East 
Timor, the predominantly Roman Catholic island territory 
invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and forcibly annexed. We 
believe that it is of great importance that United States' 
concern over the Timor situation be stressed at this time. 
As you arn aware, dozens of people were detained and 
abused following a pro-independence demonstration during 
the visit of Pope John Paul U to East Timor on October 12, 
1989. In addition, many East Timorese who had called for 
respect for human rights and political freedom were beaten 
and bloodied by Indonesian police after leaving an informal 
meeting with United States Ambassador John Monjo during 
his visit to East Timor in January. To his credit, Ambassa-
dor Monjo registered concern over this situation. 
However, after our ambassador's visit, an atmosphere of 
fear and repression has persisted in East Timor. 
·subsequently, a top-ranking Indonesian official warned 
East Timorese to cease their protests against Indonesian 
rule, particularly in the presence of foreign visitors, or face 
harsh consequences. It has been reported that those who 
demonstrated during the ambassador's visit, and their family 
members, were threatened with disappearance. There have 
been further reports of repeated, unexplained detention and 
abuse, in some cases including torture, of a broad group of 
individuals. 
We are deeply concerned about such threats as well as 
repression against those who are peacefully attempting to 
express their views. 
There is also information that more than 100 East Tin1or-
ese villagers, including women and children, were mass-
acred in a recent Indonesian military operation, said to be 
in retaliation for the killing of three Indonesian soldiers. 
The use of East Timorese civilians as "human shields" 
(similar to the Indonesian "fence of legs" operations in past 
years) in Indonesian military operations against pro-indep-
endence guerrillas in the countryside is further proof that 
serious human rights violations continue. The "human 
shield" operations by Indonesian military forces are known 
to have caused thousands of deaths in the early 1980s, and 
the fecurrence of a similar practice is deeply disturbing. 
Indonesian military policies and actions, such as restric-
tions on where Timorese villagers can farm their crops, are 
causing periodic cycles of hunger and malnutrition in East 
Timor. A precarious situation like this is especially alarm-
ing when it is recalled that scarcely ten years ago the 
population of East Timor was decimated by a war-related 
famine. 
The United States should use its influence to help ensure 
that humanitarian needs of this nature are promptly 
addressed. This should certainly include a concerted effort 
to address the reportedly growing problem of tuberculosis 
in East Timor. 
Finally, in light of the continuing tragic consequences of 
the 15-year-old conflict in East Timor, the United States 
should support a process of peace talks that could lead to 
negotiations without ·preconditions among the parties 
directly involved. 
Editor's note: 
This latest in a series of letters sent to the US administra-
tion by members of Congress not only exceeds the previous 
record of 194 signatures. It also refers for the first time to 
the crucial question of Washington supporting a process of 
peace talks. to lead to negotiations with no pre-conditions, 
the very pomt stressed by Shanana Gusmao in his interview 
with Robert Domm. 
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Timorese seek refuge in 
church 
After the 4 September conflict between students and the 
Indonesian security forces, some East Timorese students 
went into hiding in the Motael church in the outskirts of 
Dili. On Sunday 19 November, 13 students still remained 
in the church. According to sources just back from a visit 
to Dili, Indonesian troops forced their way into the church 
and arrested 3 students. The names of those arrested are not 
known but of the remaining students, seven names have 
been identified: 
EAST TIMOR · 
Vasco Gomes, Gregorio da Cunha, Baptista da 
Sequeira, Estanislau Carceres, Aleixo da S. Gama, 
Augusto Mausiri, and Jorge M. A. Serrano. 
Their demands to the Indonesian authorities: the right to 
demonstrate, no manhandling by the authorities and a 
demand to Brig. Gen. Warouw, commander of Dili, and 
Colonel Gatot Purwanto, head of intelligence, to keep their 
promise to soften the security approach in East Timor. 
[From our Tapol correspondent in Jakarta] * 
CENSCJRSf!lP." .····•. 
Two journals forced to the wall 
After much talk about openness, the cause of a free press has taken a battering. A popular weekly 
owned by a leading publisher, Gramedia, has been banned and the same company decided to surrender 
another of its publishing licences. Then came the Jakarta police ban closing a satirical drama, police 
intervention which prevented the poet, Rendra, from reciting a programme of his poems, an exclusion 
order against the New York Times correspondent and a ban on the circulation of the International 
Herald Tribune and the Australian Financial Review. [Tempo, 13 October 1990) 
The press 
Tabloid banned 
A weekly tabloid, Monitor, has had its licence to publish 
(SIUPP) revoked and its editor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, is 
to be prosecuted for causing offence to Muslim religious 
sentiment. The publication faced these heavy penalties 
following an uproar provoked by a story published on 15 
October which listed 50 personalities chosen by its readers 
as their favourites. Many Muslim organisations felt outraged 
because the poll listed the Prophet Mohammad in eleventh 
place, with pop stars ranked higher. 
Monitor was a highly popular weekly with a circulation of 
over 700,000. It highlighted pop stars and well-known TV, 
radio and film personalities, one of many journals published 
by the Gramedia Magazines Group (KGM), owned by the 
company which owns Kompas, the second largest daily. 
Ban follows warning 
Three days before the ban, the government served the 
weekly with a stem warning which should have been the 
end of the matter. Shaken by the strength of feeling his poll 
had aroused, the editor Arswendo published a special 
edition, devoting the front page to an apology and retracting 
the article. To placate Muslim groups, he publicly 
apologised on television. 
But some groups started demonstrating outside the 
editorial office, forcing their way in to cause extensive 
damage. Some circles even started hinting that the unfortu-
nate Arswendo was 'Indonesia's Salman Rushdie'. 
Although normally a 'stern warning' only leads to a ban if 
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A fresh wind, under the shadow of the SIUPP. 
the Information Minister, Harmoko, announced three days 
later that the weekly's SIUPP had been revoked. 
Meanwhile, Arswendo had turned himself in to the police, 
to demonstrate that he felt responsible for having uninten-
tionally caused offence but also for his own protection. 
But his troubles were not over. After being in police 
custody for about a week, it was announced that he would 
face trial for causing offence to religious sentiment under 
Articles 156, 157 and 171 of the Criminal Code which 
carry a maximum penalty of five years. 
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Far from coming to the aid of a persecuted member, the 
Indonesian journalists' association, PWI, sided with his 
persecutors and announced his expulsion. Without PWI 
membership Arswendo's career as a journalist is finished. 
Arswendo's poll was nothing more than a circulation 
booster. He had not compiled a list of people for readers to 
choose from but invited the readers to vote for anyone they 
chose, including personal friends. Top of the poll was 
President Suharto and several of his family. The poll was 
linked to a lottery, with five million rupiahs for the lucky 
entrant, of whom there were 34,000. 
Few have rallied to Arswendo's defence. Perhaps the most 
level-headed response has come from Abdurachman Wahid, 
leader of the Muslim Nahdatul Ulama, who criticised those 
who wax furious at this misdemeanour but say nothing 
about numerous injustices in society. He rejected the use of 
press bans under any circumstances because they obstruct 
the free flow of information. [Tempo, 27 /X/1990] 
One group to go against the stream was a Muslim Stu-
dents Committee in Semarang which called for the tabloid 
to be reinstated. [Jakarta Post, 1/XI/1990] The original 
document which is circulating abroad bears 452 signatures 
of students whose names and coJleges are clearly identified. 
It called for the Jaw on publishing licences to be repealed 
and stressed that the principle of the presumption of 
innocence must be upheld. 
Admiral Sudomo and Information Minister Harmolw. A 
little tiff over who should keep an eye on the press? 
[Tempo, 13 October 19907 
Suharto upholds press ban law 
A few weeks before disaster befeJJ Monitor, a controversy 
broke out in government circles when Admiral Sudomo, 
Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, said 
that the Jaw empowering the Information Minister to revoke 
press licences would be repealed, leaving editors or jour-
nalists who step out of line to face court proceedings. 
Sudomo may have thought he was reflecting Suharto's 
remark in August that differences of opinion are now 
permissible. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 101, October 19901 
Sudomo is thought by some to be promoting openness, to 
encourage people to speak out agairist Suharto. 
Sudomo's promise to end the SIUPP regulation encour-
aged many to describe the fear which pervades the media. 
The SIUPP cancellations which shut down Sinar Harapan, 
the country's leading daily, in 1986, and Prioritas in 1987, 
were frequently mentioned in the discussion that ensued. 
However, it was soon apparent that Sudomo had spoken out 
of tum. Harmoko emerged from a meeting with Suharto to 
announce that SIUPPs were here to stay. He claimed that 
media workers need not fear it, as Jong as 'they keep within 
the law'. He quoted the president as saying: 
The press must use press freedoms guaranteed in the 1982 
Basic Press Law in a responsible way. Anyone who dis-
agrees clearly wants to evade the responsibilities of 
freedom and favours freedom according to liberalism. 
(Liberalism is second only to communism as the demon of 
Indonesia's 'Pancasila democracy'.) 
An extreme example of self-censorship 
A few weeks after Monitor was banned, it was discovered 
that a light-weight magazine Senang, currently being 
produced by KGM had earJier, in a September issue, com-
mitted what could be seen as an offence to Muslim sensi-
tivities. 
A reader who was trying to have a vision of the Prophet, 
had asked the magazine's advice column to interpret a 
dream. The columnist caJled the dream 'insignificant' and 
illustrated the reply with a turbaned and cloaked, faceless 
figure bearing a halo, presumed to be a visual representa-
tion of Mohammad. (Muslims regard any visual representa-
tion of the Prophet as sacrilegious.) 
The column came to light when Pelita, a daily of the 
government party, Golkar, which addresses itself to a 
Muslim readership, drew attention to the piece. Without 
further ado, KGM boss, Jacob Oetama, who also edits 
Kompas, handed the Senang SIUPP back to Information 
Minister Harmoko, and announced that the journal had 
ceased publication. 
Among a number of comments solicited by Editor, 
Nahdatul Ulama's Abdurachman Wahid was critical of 
'trigger happy' Muslim leaders who had incited antipathy 
towards other religions, inflaming demonstrations and the 
damage of property. Muslims suffer from an inferiority 
complex and a sense of insecurity, he said. 
A scapegoat 
In an essay on Arswendo's fate, published by Editor, Arief 
Budiman, lecturer in social science at Satya Wacana 
University, Salatiga, wrote that Arswendo is the victim of 
a social process which needs scapegoats. 
Although Muslims make up the majority of the nation, 
their political role is insignificant. The Monitor case has 
made it possible for them to demand attention. Information 
Minister needed a case like this to show that his power to 
revoke a SU/PP is still necessary, (despite what Political 
and Social Affairs Minister-Coordinator Sudomo has said). 
In the fiercely competitive press world, Monitor's com-
petito_rs have received a blessing in disguise, now that a 
gap i~ t~e market is waiting to be filled. The journalists' 
association, PW! (by expelling Arswendo) has posed as a 
body sensitive to public demands. And Gramedia itself, to 
safeguard its greater interests, has sacked Arswendo from 
all his posts. 
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The death of 'Suksesi' 
Some weeks before the press crackdown, the Jakarta police 
ordered a well-attended farce, Suksesi to close down. 
Kompas commented in an editorial entitled, 'Has the fresh 
wind of openness been halted in its tracks?' 
Tempo [20.X.1990] quoted the playwright, Norbertus 
Riantiamo (Nano) as saying his plays are portraits of 
society and nothing more. Asked whether the ban on an 
earlier play of his, Sampek Engtay in Medan last year had 
prepared him for the present ban, he said: 
I never thought this would happen to 'Suksesi '. My only 
thought was to produce something entertaining. Succession 
is not a banned topic. It is being discussed everywhere and 
now, there is the fresh wind of openness, meaning we need 
not fear creativity or differences of opinion. This is why I 
wrote Suksesi. 
Now, I'll write another play. If that's banned, I'll write 
another one and if that's banned, I'll go on writing till my 
plays are not banned. 
Tempo, 20 October 1990. 
Tempo summarised the story which centres on the rivalry 
between four sons and daughters of a king, each plotting to 
oust him. At fust, the daughter, Diab Roro Suksesi, is only 
interested in accumulating wealth, helped by her father, and 
busies herself with social works. But later she joins forces 
with .an army officer to oust the king. [The likeness 
between this character and Suharto's oldest daughter, Siti 
Hardiyanti Rukmana, Tutut, is unmistakeable.] 
Before the ban, Nano was interrogated for four hours by 
the police and latei:: summoned by BAIS, the Strategic 
Intelligence Agency. There was no suggestion, says Nano, 
that performances should stop. But the Jakarta chief of 
police claims Nano was told to stop and when that did not 
happen, the play was banned. 
Rendra poetry reading halted 
A poetry reading by Indonesia's leading poet, W.S. Rendra, 
was called off when Jakarta police interfered just as it was 
about to begin on 8 November 1990. Crowds were already 
queuing for tickets outside Jakarta's Ismael Marzuki Art 
Centre when a statement by Rendra was posted. announcing 
that the authorities had ordered him not to include two of 
.... - .. 
CENSORSHIP 
the seven poems on the programme. Rendra refused because 
this would be in conflict with his own conscience, and it 
would be an insult to his audience. As a result, the poetry 
reading was cancelled. 
The two poems ·to which the authorities took exception 
were entitled: 'The prayer of a young Rangkasbitung man 
in Rotterdam' and 'For the people of Rangkasbitung'. 
In the fust of these poems, Rendra wrote about the impact 
of tourism, motels and plantations on the countryside - girls 
fleeing the villages to get jobs in massage parlours and 
young men becoming beggars in the cities, only to be 
rounded up and thrown into prison. 
The second poem expresses the views of a modem-day 
Multatuli. [Multatuli was a 19th century Dutch colonial 
official who was dismissed for speaking out against the 
oppressive role of native administrators, used by the Dutch 
to exploit village communities. His novel, Max Havelaar , 
published in 1860, was a devastating exposure of the 
oppressive and corrupt nature of Dutch rule in Java.] 
Rendra wrote: "The people are exploited by their own 
district chiefs. Peasants only sweat, never laugh and their 
basic rights are flaunted." One verse reads as follows: 
I see 
the industrialised countries giving economic aid. 
The people 
in the developing countries 
lose their land 
so that rich people can play golf, 
or so that dams can be built 
to supply electricity 
to industries set up by foreign investors. 
And all the poor unfortunate people get, Dear God, 
for each square metre of their land 
is enough money to buy 
a pack of American cigarettes. 
The foreign press 
New York Times correspondent in South East Asia, Steve 
Erlanger, has been banned from visiting Indonesia following 
the publication of an article which argued that Suharto's 
main consideration in deciding whether to stand down in 
1993 was to protect the business interests of his family. The 
articJe first appeared in the New York Times on 11 Novem-
ber entitled "For Suharto, .his heirs are key to life after '93". 
A day later, it appeared on the front page of the Interna-
tional Herald Tribune under the title "Suharto's Indonesia: 
A Family 'Toll Mahal"'. It was also published in the 
Australian Financial Review. 
Besides announcing a ban on Erlanger, Information 
Minister Harmoko said action would be taken against IHTs 
distributor in Indonesia, NV Indoprom for "failing to apply 
the country's self-censorship policy". [UPI, 17 November] 
A week later, it was announced that the company would no 
longer distribute either of the papers. [Reuter, 24.XI.1990] 
Less than two months ago, Minister-Coordinator Sudomo 
said the government had stopped blacking out offending 
items in foreign journals that circulate in Indonesia. 
However, writing about the business interests of the Suharto 
fai;nily was too much to take. It was, said Harmoko, an 
"insult to the head of state and discredited the nation". 
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New labour union formed 
Strikes and demonstrations against low wages and abysmal working conditions are becom~ng more and 
more frequent in Indonesia. The government-backed union, SPSI, has no teeth to fight for real 
improvement in workers' conditions, so now, a new independent labour organisation has been 
established. 
The new labour organisation, Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setia 
Kawan or Solidarity Free Trade Union, has been set up by 
workers and human rights activists. H.J.C. Princen, director 
of the Jakarta-based Institute for the Defence of Human 
Rights is the chairperson and Saut Aritonang is secretary-
General. At the official launch in Jakarta, November 14, 
Princen said it planned to campaign for better wages and 
working conditions through a "union free from the influence 
of the owners of industry, employers and the government" . 
The organisers acknowledged that cheap labour had 
attracted investment, but said it also meant "disaster for the 
workers". The union already has about 5,000 members and 
plans to hold a congress early next month to elect a leader 












Poncke Princen. [Editor, 24 November] With his indepen-
dent union in the news, his photo is appearing again. 
A few days before, Princen said: "We know what's 
impossible. Let's work on what's possible. If we can't have 
international standard wages, let's start talking about a 
decent living wage". On the need to attract investment, he 
said: "We believe in the importance of economic growth. 
But what is growth if the people who make it possible don't 
share the profits of growth?" [Reuter 7 November, 1990] 
Government: 'Setia Kawan is illegal' 
Two days after the launch, Coordinating Minister for 
Politics and Security, Admiral Sudomo said the government 
only recognised the government-sponsored SPSI, not the 
new one which has not registered with the interior ministry 
and was illegal. Princen said he was prepared to register 
Setia Kawan with the ministry. The right to set up a union 
was written in the constitution and not even the government 
could take it away. "I want to bring this case to the courts 
to see who is right... I'm willing to challenge him [Sudomo) 
to a public debate on television," [Reuter November 16) 
Officially, the government insists that each sector of the 
community may have only one organisation, but a precedent 
breaking the mould was set a few months ago when the 
lawyers' organisation lkadin split into two; most govern-
ment departments continue to recognise Jkadin while the 
breakaway W has been accorded recognition by the 
Justice Minister. 
Few people doubt that the SPSI is totally ineffective. It 
has branches in less than 10,000 of the 126,000 busi-
ness in the country. The International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions has refused it recognition while the US trade 
union organisation, AFL-CIO, sees it as nothing more than 
an extension of the government. Set up in 1985 to replace 
an earlier government creation, the FBSI discredited itself 
from the start by electing a businessman, Imam Sudarwo, 
as chairman. This year's SPSI congress which opened in 
Jakarta on 25 November is expected to elect a new chair. 
The three candidates are: Utoyo Usman, deputy head of the 
indoctrination agency, BP-7; former police chief, retired 
Gen. Awaluddin Djamin. and retired Gen. Sutopo Yuwono, 
a former chief of the state intelligence agency, Bakin. 
Bitter labour disputes 
With Indonesian workers among the worst paid in the 
world, a new independent union representing their interests 
has come not a moment too soon. The minimum wage -
Rp 2,100 (US $1.15) a day for Jakarta and far lower 
elsewhere in the country - is totaUy inadequate to profect 
workers from poverty. According to a 1989 study of women 
workers in 10 typical Jakarta factories by the International 
Labour Organisation, 88% were malnourished. [Letter, Far 
Eastern Economic Review November 8, 1990] These rock-
bottom wages are unlikely to increase under the govern-
ment's repressive labour policies. Such is the level of 
repression that some companies have sacked workers 
pushing for the formation of a branch of the existing 
government-backed union in their workplaces. Those who 
protest or strike are typically labe11ed communists, dis-




the dismissal by a Jakarta real estate company of 38. 
workers who demanded overtime payment which they 
had not received since 1986' 
' 
the interrogation by police of workers involved in a 
demonstration for higher wages at a plywood plant in 
Gresik, East Java, during which the head of personnel's 
car was damaged; 




the dismissal of 27 workers by PT Sandratex of Tang-
erang, for demanding the minimum daily wage of Rp 
1,600 and asking that married women workers be 
allowed to live in their own homes instead of in the 
on-site company dormitories; 
the publication in a newspaper of names and photo-
graphs of dismissed employees, by their former 
employer, thus ruining their chances of future employ-
ment; 
the failure by a garment manufacturers, to pay sever-
ance pay to 100 workers laid off, due to reduced sales 
resulting from the Gulf crisis. 
In Jakarta, there have been 23 official strikes so far this 
year, against 14 in the whole of 1989 but Jabour activists 
put the number of unofficial strikes at over 200. The 
government is worried by the apparent snowballing of 
industrial action, but also wants to change Indonesia's 
image as a heavy-handed labour repressor. The recent 
revocation by manpower minister Cosmas Batubara of a 
1963 presidential decision banning strikes was a gesture 
towards the US, where the AFUCIO has long argued that 
Indonesian labour laws are an obstacle to continuing GSP 
(Generalised System of Preferences) status for Indonesian 
exports. In fact the lifting of the ban was meaningless since 
the 'vital government projects' covered by the ban have long 
been completed [see TAPOL Bulletin 101). Nevertheless, 
Batubara found it necessary to explain that the lifting of the 
ban had been mistakenly taken as a go-ahead for strikes. If 
both sides observed PancasiJa Industrial Relations (where 
disagreements are settled by consensus), there would be no 
need for strikes, he claimed. 
Low wages: the major attraction 
The manpower minister has been trying to persuade 
companies that permitting their workers to set up a section 
of SPSI and paying them a decent wage is in the compan-
ies' interests. However, according to the Financial Times: 
"The almost total absence of labour unrest, together with 
officiaIJy sanctioned low wages in Indonesia, have been one 
of the main factors in attracting large amounts of foreign 
investment to the country." The manpower department 
prefers to stress 'stability' [ie, the repression of workers' 
rights] over low wages as the main attraction for investors, 
but the investors themselves make no bones about the pull 
of low wages. A Japanese businessman whose company is 
one of many setting up in a new business park on the 
Indonesian island of Batam, near Singapore, said: "We'r~ 
going to Batam in search of cheap labour." In Singapore he 
would have to pay 900-1,000 Singapore doIJars a month for 
each assembly-line worker, in Malaysia between 300 and 
350 dollars; in Batam he wiJI pay his Indonesian worker 
just 215 Singapore dollars a month. [Kyodo, 26 Oct. 1990) 
* 
Bonar gets 8 years 6 months 
A graduate student at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, 
Bonar Tigor Naipospos, has been sentenced to eight and 
a half years, accused under Indonesia's anti-subversion law 
of disseminating Marxist teaching. [For details, see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 101, October 1990) 
Bonar's sentence exceeds the 7 and 8 years handed down 




"Cheap labour for sale." Indonesia's strongest appeal to 
foreign investors. 
Editor, 8 September 1990 
Nugroho last year. The verdict led to student demonstra-
tions which were broken up by police using teargas. Asia 
Watch has condemned the sentence as making "a mockery 
of President Suharto's call for ... more political openness. If 
a student can be convicted of subversion for trying to 
encourage discussions about social, economic and political 
change in Indonesia, it suggests that the Indonesian govern-
ment has no tolerance for differences of opinion." 
Owing to lack of space, we are unable to outline Bonar's 
defence plea in court. We hope to do so in our next issue.* 
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Blood on their banner: Nationalist Struggles in 
the South Pacific, by David Robie, publishers: 
Zed books Ltd. & Pluto Press, 1989 
Journalist David Robie has succeeded in compiling an 
important up-to-date account of colonialis~ and co?flict ~n 
the South Pacific, drawing on his substantial expenence m 
the area as a reporter for Agence France Presse, and several 
Australian New Zealand and Third World publications. It , . 
is from this Pacific perspective that East Timor and West 
Papua are discussed, in the second chapter of the book. 
Identified as one of the three major colonial powers in the 
region, alongside the United States and France, Indonesia 
continues to deny the people of East Timor and West Papua 
the right to self-determination enjoyed by other Pacific 
nations. 
The 'Forgotten Wars' chapter throws us straight into the 
heart of colonial aggression, at the moment of Indonesia's 
invasion of East Timor, with the ill-fated Democratic 
Republic of East Timor's last radioed plea for international 
help. We are then confronted with first-hand accounts of 
atrocities committed against Dili's citizens by the invading 
forces. The immediacy of these reports contrasts starkly 
with the cool complicity of the nations who failed to 
condemn the invasion. 
Both East Timor and West Papua are presented as the 
victims of betrayal by larger P,Owers, while those less 
powerful are prey to the 'political hooliganism' of the more 




Yet more censorship has struck the Indonesian capital, with 
a police order preventing a satirical play about Jakarta's 
slums from going ahead, only hours before it was due to 
commence a ten-day run on 28 November. The play, 
Opera Kecoa (Cockroach _Opera) was being staged by the 
same company, the Theater Koma Group whose play, 
Suksesi, was closed down a month earlier. 
The ·play, which has been staged several times in the last 
ten years, contains several songs with lyrics now deemed by 
the police as being 'likely to create a public disturbance'. 
'Economist' banned 
Meanwhile, another foreign journal to have incurred the 
censor's wrath is the London Economist. The issue of 17 
November 1990 failed to appear on the book stalls because 
of an article entitled, "Suharto and the reins of power". 
Oddly enough, the article for the m~in part eulo~es 
Suharto's regime for being on the bnnk of producmg 
"another of those famous Asian economic miracles". 
However it failed to please the censors for devoting a few 
' . . 
short paragraphs to some facts about the busmess mteres~s 
of Suharto's children. What better proof that Suharto IS 
acutely embarrassed by any mention of a subject which can 
only be described as his Achilles' heel? 
support for the liberation movemen~. The role of foreign 
support for Indonesia in its occupation of East Tunor and 
West Papua is eloquently exposed. Robie uncov.er~, for 
example, how Canberra's lack of res~nse to th~ kilJmg of 
five Australian journalists by Indonesian troops m October 
1975, and the absence of intemationa! ou~rage, gave 
Suharto the green light for a fuJJ scale _mvas.10n of East 
Timor. Washington's complicity in the mvas10n .of ~t 
Timor is linked to the control of the strategic Ombai Str~1ts, 
in addition to oil. Australia's failure to speak out a1?am~t 
Indonesia's handling of the so-called Act of Free Choice m 
West Papua is roundly condemned. 
David Robie's admirable book leads us up to the near-
present of 1989, the year of the !imor Gap. Treaty and the 
cosmetic 'opening up' of East Timor. and, m 'Yest Papua, 
continued raids by Indonesian troops mto P~G m searc~ of 
OPM guerrillas. Today, in East Timor, resistance ag~mst 
Indonesian rule has intensified with 'intifada'-styJe actrnns 
in the urban centres and continued activity in the bush by 
Falintil, the armed resistance; for West Papuans, Papua New 
Guinea's powerlessness to resist Indonesian pressure spells 
further betrayal after the extradition from PNG of O~M 
leader Meclcy Salosa, and the possibiJity. of Indones~a~ 
troops being stationed in PNG border villages. Robie s 
optimism that 'the future prospect of a Free West Papua 
may yet emerge' may seem hopelessly 1!1isplaced. ~u.t if 
raising international awareness of the persistent colomahsm 
in this part of the world, - whether the colonisers are old-
style European or new-generation Third World colonisers -
can contribute to their demise, then David Robie's Blood 
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